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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
The United States merchant, marine hns had a long, successful
history of meeting challenges and being a leader in the mariti.me
world. U.S. merchant sailors have invented new ships. such as
the Schooner and clipper, which were faster and more beautiFul than
any other sailing ships of the day. The famous clipper ships of the
1840's often sailed at 18 to 19 knots, faster than many cargo ships
1
today.
The Ur;lited States took the lead again, when steam repLaced
sail, with the 55 Savannah which demonstrated the reliability oE
steam by successfully crossing the Atlantic Ocean in 1819. 'The
advent of steam, however, also spejled the beginnin~ of the decliNe
of the U.S. merchant marine. The u.s. lacked the abundant coal
close to the sea and the skilled iron workers Great Britain had.
further, the U. s. began to ]cwk inward to opening up the Hest.
Investors spent their money in development of railroads which
caused mar.itime transportation to hrrther dec~ine.2
War has had 'U major affect on the U. S. merch81'tt marine as
weJLl. The Civil Har seriously damaged shipping with many vessels
destroyed or sold abroad. High post war: prices and taxe' further
I
l'l;;J.mpered efforts to revive shipping. ~Then l;'!or:ld Har I began, the
U.s. began to realize haw serious the decline bad been when it
became necessary to rely on foreign vessels to transport men and
3
supplies to the fip,hting fronts.
A great shipbuildin,g prop,ram was begun under the stimulus
of war. The Shipping Act of 1916 established a government agency,
the U.S. Shipping Board, which was given the authority to set up a
corporation to build ships. The Emergency Fleet Corporation built a
total of 2,318 vessels from 1918 to 1922, hut most of them were
delivered after the war was over. Since they had been hurri.edly
designed under emergemey conditions, many of these were not suited to
. 4peacet~me 1I$€.
Tn ]936, a [lew law was passed. ThiB Merchant Mari.ne Act of
1936 declared it to be the national policy to foster the development
and encourage the maintenance of a mex:chant m:'l.rine sufficient to carry
the domestic waterborne commerce and a sub~tantial port.ioD of the
foreign commerce of the country in essential trades, capable of
serving as a naval and military auxiliary in time of W:'l.L.5
{-vorld War 11 increased the demand for merchant vessels. Pi !chin
a year and a: half after the United States entered the war in 1941
the shipyards were building ships faster than the enemy was able to
s'nk them. From 1942 through 1%5 U.S. shipyards built 5,592 merchant
ships, of ~'hich 2,701 ....'ere Liberty ship, 414 were the faste.r Vicl;:01:Y
2
type, 651 were tankers, 417 were standard cargo shj,ps, Rnd the
". 1 409 "1" . 6 5h' 1 t IremS1nlRg, were m1 1tary or mlnor types. lpS were a so acen
over from private operators in hoth domestic and foreign txades:
foreign ships were bought; enemy ships in U.S. ports were seized.
The Korean and Vietnam conflicts also highlighted again tne
need for: a ready, able, militarily useful, merchant fleet to CC1:Try
essential supplies to foreign shores. During the Korean conflict in
1953 the U.S. had more than 2,400 dry cargo ships available. During
Vietnam, 15 years later, the numher of ships had decreaRed to about:
l,200 militarily useful dry cargo ships. Today, there are only a,bout
430 ships which can he placed into service (see Figure 1).7
Recent Decline of the U.S. Flag Me~~~ant Marine
This decline in military useful ships is one indication of
the general decline in the U.S. merchant marine since the mass've
Liberty and Vic~ory programs of World War II. As the statiRtics in
Part II will Hhow, the U.S. flag merchant marine is facing possible
nonexistence if a resurgence is not realized within this decade.
Numbers of ships is only a small part of a comDlicated prob.1em,
however. A more serious question is th~ idea of ami) itarily usefu
hulL The container revolution of the 1970' s haA bred a class of
ships dependent on complex port faci,li ties which are not available.
in many of the areas where military contingencies may arise. The
recent British military operation in the Falkland Islands is case
3
FIGURE 1
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SOURCE: Vice Admiral Kent J. Carroll, "Sealift - The Achilles
Heel of American Mobility," Defense 82, (August 1982), p. 12.
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and point. More than 70% of the British ships were merchant-type
ships, manned by civilians - and more than 30% of those were tankers. 8
The Britisl, learned that the most useful and needed ships - after
tankers - were the reliable, self-sustaining, dry cargo breakbulk
ships. Container ships had little uti] tty other than as use as air~
craft second echelon maintenance ships.9
Could the United States "win" a Falkland Island conflict of
its own today? This quest.-ion has helped spark a rekindling of the
importance of sealift to militaxy operations. Many programs to
increase U.S. sealift capabilities are now underway at a rapid pace
including programs to make the money-making containerships useful for
military requirements.
In Chapter lIT, the commercial and military requirements for
the u.s. lag merchant marine will be examined. as well as the types
of ships needed to meet tho$e requirements.
In Chapter IV, the Military Sealift Enhancoment, Containership
Adaptation, and! Multi-purpose Mobili-zation Ship Programs \.... iH be
discussed and evaluated.
Chapters V and VI will examine the dIfferences between
commercial and military interests in the U.S. flag merchant marine,
some possible solutions, and the outlook for the future.
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CHAPTER II
U.S. FLAG MERCHANT FLE~T (STATISTICS)
In world fleet rankings as of January 1, 1981, the privately
owned U. S. fleet placed eighth on a dead 'weight tonnage basis and
eleventh on tire basis of number OR ships (see Table 1).
In calendar year 1980, commercial cargoes carried by ships of
all flags in the U.S. oceanborue trade totaled 772.2 million tons, the
lowest level since 1976 (see Table 2).
The general decline of the U.S. merchant fleet is continuing.
A review of the merchant marine statistics as of November 1, 1982,
reveals that the u.s. fleet consi.sts of 487 active and 341 inAc.:t've
ships (see Table 3). It is important to note that tankers and inter-
modal vessels (containerships, barge carrying vessels, and Roll~On/
RoLl/Off or RO/RO vanships) account for 357 of the 487 active vessels
for 73.3 percent, while older type freighters account for on~y 81 Of
487 for 16.6 percent. In the inactive fL12et, however, f-rei)?,hters
make up 215 of the 341 vessels for 63 percent, most of which are
government owned.
The November I, 1982 statistic~ also indicate t..hat tine U.S.
fla~ mere-hant fleet is primarily employed in domestic trade with 228
ships, mostly tankers, compared to only 169 employed in foreign
trade (see Table 4).
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TABLE 1
~~JOR MERC~~T FLEETS OF THE WORLD - JANUARY] 1981
No. of
Country Shipsl
Liberia 2.271
Greece 2,928
Japan 1,762
United Kingdom 1,056
Norway 616
Panama 2,437
USSR 2,530
United States
(Privately Owned) 5782
France 345
Italy 622
Spain 509
Germany (Federa 1
Republic of) 473
Singapore 622
China (Peoples
Republic) 695
Tndia 170
Rank by
No. of
Ships
4
1
5
6
10
3
2
11
18
8
12
13
9
7
17
neadweight
Tons
153,342,000
69,559,000
62,001,000
42,302,000
38,575,000
38,011,000
21,757,000
21,103,000
19,539,000
17,269,000
12,235,000
11,863,000
11,754,000
10,129,000
9,221,000
Rank by
Deadweight
Tonnage
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
lS
All Others
Total
7,053
24,867 654,909,000
NOTE 1: Oceangoing merchant ships of 1,000 gross tons and over.
NOTE 2: Includes 286 U.S. Government-owned ships of 2,9R7,OOO dwt.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration,
MARAn 81, n'iashington. D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983) p. 17.
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TABLE 2
U.S. OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE/COMMERCIAL CARGO CARRIED
TQnnage (Mil lions)
Calendar Year 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Total Tons 615.6 698.8 775.3 775.6 823.1 772.2
U.S.-Flag Tons 31. 4 33.8 34.8 32.1 35.0 28 . .2
U.S. Percent of Total 5.1 4.8 4.5 L,.l 4.2 3.7
Liner Total Tons 44.3 49.R 47.8 56.5 57.0> 59.3
Liner U.S.-Flag Tons 13.6 15.4 14.4 16.0 15.7 16.2
Liner U.S. Percent 30.7 30.9 30.2 28.3 27.5, 27.3
Non-Liner Total Tons 275.3 289.6 289.8 308.8 342.7 356.7
Non-Liner U.S.-Flag Tons 3.8 4.9 5.7 4.5 3.6 4.1
Non-Liner U.S. Percent 1.,4 1. 7' 2.0 1.5 1.0 1.2
Tanker Total 'rons 296.0 359.4 438.6 410.3 423.4 356.3
Tanker U.S.-Flag Tons 14.0 13.6 14.6 11. 6 15.7 7.9
Tanker U.S. Percent 4.7 3.8 3.3 2.8 3.7 2.2
Value ($ Billions)
Total Value 127.5 148.4 171.2 95.8 242.1 29/,.3
U.S.-Flag Value 22.4 26.4 28.0 30.7 35.7 42.3
U.S. Percent of Total 17.5 17.8 16.4 15.7 14.7 14.4
Liner Jotal Value 64.0 7'5.8 82.3 99.9 H7.6 136.9
Liner U. S.-Flag Value 20.0 23.9 25.2 28.6 32.5 39.2
Liner U. S. Percent 31.2 31. 6 30.. 7 28.6 27.6 28.7
Non-Liner Total Value 36.6 38.2 1.,2.7 52.5 62.0 74.1
Non-Liner U. S.·~Flag Value 1.0 1.1 1.2 J..O 1.1 1.3
Non-Liner U.S. Per.cent 2 . .8 2.8 2.8 1.8 . 7 1.8
Tanker Total Value 26.9 34.4 46.2 43.4 62.5 83.3
Tanke.:r: u. S.-Flag Value 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.1 2.1 1.8
Tanker U.S. Perc.ent 5.1 4.2 3.5 2.7 3.4 2 .. 1
SOURCE: U.S. Department of transportation, Maritime Administration,
MARAD ' 81. (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1983) p. 19.
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TABLE 3: UNITED StATES OCEANCOIMG HlRCM~ HARINE
Hovemb~ r 1. 1982
(Tonna~e in Thous.,nds).!L U
PriV8u1X Owned GoYern~ent Owned Totd
Number of GroBII Deafiwei,ht Humher of Grou DeadwlI!i~"t Humber of GrO.511 Dell iiVil-,h t
Ships Tons TO.nll Ships Tons Tons Ship. Ton. TOJ\a
ACTIVE FLEET:
COIllllo PUlI/CarllO 5 74 &2 5 58 39 10 132 82
Frei"htu~ 75 809 1,000 6 Itl 51 81 .850 1,052
Bu lk Carriers 16 299 524 0 0 0 16 ' 299 524
Tankers 228 6,610 12,934 2 14 21 230: 6,624 12,955
In~ermodal 127 2,519 2,668 0 0 0 127 2,519 2,668
Tur/Barl!te 14 246 464 ,0 0 0 14:' 246 464
LMG 9 151 64) 0 (j 0 9 151 643
TOTAL: 474 11,]08 18,275 1~ 113 111 487 11,421 18,388
INACTIVE ru:r.T:
COI"lbo· p.,,/Car:~o 3 41 22 42 460 280 45 501 302
Ft"eh:hters 32 357 433 183 1,415 2,003 215 1,'812 2,436
<.D Bu·! k Curiert 1 )8 62
°
0 0 3 .38 62
TlI"kers 40 1,132 2,127 12 130 212 52 1,262 2.,338
l,ntemodll1 12 '190 221 9 126 U? 21 315 359
TUll/hr,e 1 26 41 0 0 0 1 26 41
LNC 4 292 285 0 0 0 4 292 211S
TOTAL: 95 2,076 J,191 246 ~I 2,191 2, ~.J2 341 4,266 5.,823
Comtoo Pau/Car!':o 8 115 65 47 5t7 319 55 632 384
Frei~hter. 107 1,166 1,433 189 1,5U 2,054 296 2,683 3,487
au lie Carriers 19 337 585 0 0, 0 19 337 585
tanken 2,68 7, 74~ 15,061 14 144 23'2 282 1.885 15,293
Int~rlllOdal 139 2,109 2,890 q 126 137 148' 2,834 3,'027
Tult/hr~e ~5 272 505 0 0
°
IS 212 505
Llle l3 ~,O43 928 0 0 0 II 1,043 928
TOTAL AMERICAN FLAC: 569 13,383 21,467 2.59 2,304 2,142 828 15,,686 24,210
11 Totah are prelilllinary a ..." refh·ct: rCl\!ntHn~.
2/ DaU 8IJIlplied hy Off ice of Tude St:udi~8 an.d ,st,l,i" tic!!.
31 Includea I ves.el in ba~ehoal charter and 7 ve••ell in cUllody of ot~er atencie ••
!:I Inchlde. National Defen." Reserve' Fleet which con.hta of 237 Ihip., of which 16 ar••er.p. c.n~id.tl!'••
SOURCE: U.S. Department of IJ::ansportation, Maritime Administyation
TABLE 4: SUMMARY' - ALL VESSEL TYPES
EKPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES f'LA.G OCEANGOINC MERCHAN'): FLEET AS OF NOVEMBER I, 1982
VESSELS OF 1,000 CROSS TONS AND OV,ER BY OWN~RSHtp, STATUS AND AREA OF ~f1PLOYMENT
(Excludes veasel. ope~.ting exclusively on the Great Lakes, inland waterways and those ovned by the
United States A~y and Navy and special types .uch .s c.bie ships, tugs. etc.)
(Tonnage in Thousands)
V e s a e 1 T }' P e
Comb injl tion
Total Pass . .10 Ca~go Fre1sht~n Tanters
StatuI and Gross OwL Cro.s OwL Grols Owt. <::1'0•• tNt.
Area of Emp19~nt No. Tons Toni NQ. To.ns Tons N6. TonI Tons No. ton. Tona
Grand Total 828 15,687 24,210 55 633 384 467 5.918 7,l~9 306. 9,136 !6,621
Active Vessels 487 11.421 18,38_8 10 132 82 228 3,732 4,343 : 249 7.557 13.963
Foreign trade 169 3,243 4,171 3 33 28 149 2.632 3,093, 17 578 1.050
13 - re8 ~ - - - -7 ~ --sY 6" 132 24INearby Foreign - - -
Great Lakea~Seaway Foreign 2 24 29
- ~ - 2 24 29
Overaeas Fore1gn 1.54 3,031 3,844 3 33 28 140 2,552 3,007 H 446 809
Fore ~gn t_o Fore19n 16 8.59 878 ~
- -
5 80 84 11 779 794
-
Domestic Trade 228 6,071 11.442 2 41 15 42 611 685 184 .5.419 1:0,742
Coastwise 95 1,617 2,800 - - - IT 139 182 84 1.478 2,618I--' Intercoaatal 58 2.101 4,246 2 23 41 56 2.078 4,20.50 - - -
Noncontiguoua n 2,353 4,396 2 41 15 29 449 462 44 1.863 3,919
.
Other U.S. Agertcy Operations 7'4 1.248 1,897 5 58 39 32 409 481 37 781 1,377
X.S.C. CharteT 6I 1,135 1.786 - - - 26 368 430 35 767 1,356
- -
-
B.a. Charter & Oth~r Custody 13 113 111 5 58 39 6 41 51 2 14 21
Inactive Vellels 341 4,266 5,822 lo5 501 302 239 2,18~ 2,856 57 1.579- 2,664
Temporarily Inactive 23 363 557
- - -
13 155 194 10 208 363
- -
-
Laid-Up (Pr1vatel~ Owned) 71 1,695 2,618 3 41 22 33 412 506 3S 1,,242 2,090
Laid-Up (P~lvately Ovned/NDRF) 1 18 16
- - -
1 18 16
- - -
~ld--Up (HarM Owned IOther Tb.an NDRF) 9 100 III 2 32 19 6 57 74 1 11 18
Pend. Disp., B8 &GAA. etc. 9 100 In '2 32 19 6 57 74 r IT 18
National Defense ReBerve F1ee~ 237 2,090 2,520 40 428 261 186 1,544 2.,066 11 118 l!93
·Merchant Types TIT 1,444 1,966
- - -
169 1,412 1,912 2 32 54
Military Types 66 (j46 554 40 428 261 17 132 154 ~ 86 139
SOURC£': Department of Transportation
Office of Trade Studies .s.nd Bt.thtic.•
Division of Stattstics
E£fec~ive U.S. Control (~USC)
Besides the vessels actually registered under the U.S. f1ag~
there is a great deal of shipping owned by U.S. companies but r.egistered
under foreign flags. All orelgn registered ships owned by U.S. cit~~ens
are subject to requisitioning under authority of Section 902, Merchant
Marine Act of 1936. Tn certain emergencies, some countries might
requi re the use olf the ships on thei r registr les, including U. s. owned
ships, for national. purposes. The term "Effective U.S. Control" A.pplies
only to that sub-group of ships that would not be s'uhjeet to requl.si-
. . b If' 10tlonlng y tle country 0 reglstry.
Therefore, only controlled ships registered under Panamanian,
Honduran, and Lib~rian flags Rre considered EUSC. 11
In addition to the flag of registry, each ve"sel must me.et one
of the following conditions:
a. The ship must have over 50 percent ownership by U.S.
citizens (including corporations).
b. Ship covered by war risk insurance binders issued by MARAn.
c. Ship subject to MARAn contractual con.trol as a condition
f t f f U S £L 1 . f·' . 12o rans er 0 a >.. ag Sllp to orelgn registry.
As of January 1, 1982, the effective U.S. control :fleet
totalled 480 ships, primar lly hulk >carriers and tankers (see Table 5).
This fleet is approximately the same size as the active U.S. flag
merchant fleet. There are also approximately 159 ships owned or
11
TABLE 5
INVENTORY OF EFFECTIVE U.S. CONTROLLED (EU~C)
MERCHANT SHIPS - HONDURAS ~ LIBERIA, AND PANAMA
AS Of Jfu~UARY I, 1982
NO. GROSS TONS mrr TONS
Freighters 69 405,828 S21 !~8)1
General Cargo 20 25,4L17 164~579
Refrigerator 3-4 177,889 180,8R7
Full Container
Parti-al Container 4 6~396 10,622
Roll-On/Roll-Orf 6 2!'1,550 34,961
Barge Carriers 5 71,546 130,782
Bulk Carriers 105 3,193,673 6,348,526
General Bulk 76 1,R32~470 3~588,361
Bulk/Oil 2 62,233 119,856
Ore/Oil 10 535,216 1,142~144
aBO 17 763,754 1, 1198 ~ 163
Pa.ssen8..eF Combination 1 8,135 9~R66
Passengers 1 8,135 9~866
Tankers 305 20.• 146,798 41, 679 , 7.?-.Q.
General Tankers 2/7 19~442,]O2 40,883~990
Chemical Tankers 6 57,940 95,347
LNG 5 288,602 26.3,817
LPG 17 358,1.54 436,616
Total All Ships 480 23,754,434 48~559,993
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration~
Effective U.S. ControJ__ (EUSC) As of January l~ 1982, (w'asbington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1982) p. 1.
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partially owne,d by U.S. parent companies registered under foreign
f]ags other than Panama, Honduras or Liheria. 13
To complete the statistics, new construction o[ merchant
vessels must also be taken into account. As of March 1, 1983, there
were 13 vessels under contract in U. S. shipy?nls (see Table 6) Rnd
39 under contract in foreign shipyards (see Table 7) .
.!,U1.!:1 l ysis
Looking strictly at vessels under U.S. flag, the current
state of the merchant marine is very grim. The United States is
certainly very dependent on forei~n flag vessels to move the majority
of its waterhorne foreign commerce. In a recent address to the J982 na-
tional convention of the Propeller Club, Admiral Shear. Maritime
Administrator, U.S. Department of Transportation "aid, "' ... we find
only four percent of our international waterborne trade being moved
in Amet:ican bottoms. This compares with 42.6 percent in 195-0, 11.3
percent in 1960, and 5.3 percent in 1970.!! If the EUSC Eleet is
added to the MARA)) figures for u.s. flag vessels, the sjtuatioo
from an American business standpoint 'looks conside.rably hetter bec<:luse
"Beneficial Ownership" is the place earnings eventually go. "-Thi le
this may be good for U.S. corporations, such as EXXON which maintai.ns
a arge foreign lag tanker fleet, it doe" not hide the desperate
situation U. S. flag shipowners and shipbuilders find themselv'es as
indicated by Admiral Shear and the stati"tics.
13
TABLE £>
MERCHANT VESSELS UNDER CONTRACT OVER 2000 OWT
- AS OF MARCB 1, ]983*
(U. S. S}:IIPYARDS)
I Total
I Cost Fed'lShipbuilder Owner Type No. $ Mil Subsidy
Avondale Shipyards American Container 1 91. 0 Yes
President ,
Lines
EXXON USA Product 3 300.0 No
Bath Iron Works FALCON 1 Product 2 142.0 Yes
General Dynamics, Waterman S5 RO!RO 1 69.8 Yes
Quincy COT!'>.
New England Bulk 1 nO.O No
Electric
-
National Steel and G.E. Credit Product 1 48.5 No
Corp.
American Product
I
1 50.0 No
Trading &
Trans. Co.
I
I
I
Newport News Union Carbide Product 1 80.0 No
Shipbuilding
I
Penn Ship \vaterman S.S. RO!RO 2 137.4 Yes
Corp. I
, I
Totals 978.7
*Figures exclude tugs, barges, incinerator ships and research vessels.
SOURCE: U. S. Shipbu ild ing Report, II Ma rille Engineeri?g!Log. Apri
1983, p. 135.
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TABLE 7
MERCl-iAl'lT VESSELS UNDER CONTRACT ABROAD ~ OVER ;2.000 DHT
- AS OF MARCH 1, 1983
Shipbuilder Owner Type [~ Total CostCounITy $ Mil
Darwod U.S. Lines Container 14 784.rJ
S. Korea
Japan Equity Oil/Bulk/Ore 3 84.0
Maritime
Korea Equity Oil/Bulk/Ore 3 84.0
Maritime
--
Japan Ogden Mad.ne Bulk 2 54.0
Samsung First Amer'- l~u1k/ 2 69.1
S. Korea can Bulk Container
Pending Delta/Crowley Container 10 -
Pending II Aeron Marine Bulk 2 -
Pending Equity aU/Bulk/Ore 3 -
Maritime
I
TOTAL 39
SOURCE: "U. S. Shipbuilding Report, 11 Marine Engineering/LoR,
April 1983~ p. 135.
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CHAPTER III
EMr10YMENT OF THE U. S. FLAG MERCHANT MARINE
Introduction
The idea of employing the U.S. merchant fleet is very
complicated because of the different requirements placed on it by
various segments of the industry. These are three major i.nfluencing
groups: the ship operators, the shippers and the military which is
at times both an operator and a shipper. There groups have very
definite ideas about how the U.S. flag merchant marine should be
operated and the types of ships it needs to meet shipping requirements.
The commercial and military vie'Wpoints agree that a strong U.S. merchant
marine is needed to carry U. S. goods and for the national deEense. This
is, however, where the agTeemcnt usually ends. The liner industry lauds
the newer, morc fuel efficient, non-self-sust.aining contai.ner vessels
while the military bases most oE its planning around militarily useful
11.u 1s. such as RO/RO' s and barge C<'l rrying vessels. The. key issue
becomes one of whether the industry should dcsign military features,
such as pedestal cranes and strengthened deck supports into new ships
or should the military develop plans and equipment!'> to make any design
0'£ cargo carrying vessel sui tabl.e for mi] itary applications.
In this chnpter the industry and military needs for merchant
vessels will be examined.
16
The ShipJZ.!-IlL!ndustry
The term "shipping industry'" includes the shippers at. ~oods,
the carriers of goods and the shiphuilders. U.S. waterborne coml'l.ercc
can be divided into the domestic trades (such as the Great Lakes ore
trades and Jones Act tr.;ldes) and the oceangoing foreign trade.s.
This discussion will deal primacrily with the ocean,goinp, orei r,n
trade because of the lar?,cr types of ships used on these routes.
This foreign trade can be further divided in two general catep,ories:
the bulk trades, .such as oil, coal and gra.in, and the liner trades
which carry break-bulk cargo providing a regular service beOveen ports.
The goal of this shippinl!, industry as defined in the }1erchant
Marine Act of 1936 is to carry a substantial portion oE U.~. wflter-
borne foreign trade. This substantial portion has been p,eoera ly
viewed as being 40-50%. 14 Unfortunately, the United State~ has been
carrying only about 4% of its trade (see Table 8). MOAt of the
industry believes that shippinp; in the United States is a private.
enterprise, the object of which is to make a profit. To make a
proElt, a private enterprise must try to keep operatin~ costs to a
minimum. Merchant ships, therefore, must he designed to mflke tRe
most effective use of carRO carrying space. Any space on a merchant
vessel not utilized for carryin~ cargo is not making any money.
An equally important factor is the number of 8hips which a
company owns and the number of ships that are actually worki-np: a
17
TABLE 8
U.S. WATERBORNE FOREIGN TRADE
1921-1980
Date [Exports and Impo't"ts I
U.S, Share
(000 LT) (000 LT) %
, 92] 70,554
i
34,390
II
48.7
I1930 8l,734 30,864 37.8
1940 75,962 23,204 I 30.5
1950 I 117,216 I 49,91'4 42..6
1960 277,900 31,000 11.1
1970 473,200 25,200 I 5.3
1980 770,035 28,099 3.6
1981 I 762,981 34,833 4.6
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Tran~portation, Maritime AdministratioD.
"U. S. Maritime Indus tries Today, II Washington 1983. (mimeographed)
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particular trade route. It is a basic principle of economics, supply
and demand, which dictates that if there are more ships on a particular
tr:ade than tner,e is cargo td carry (overtonnage), the. price a sh ippcr
is willing to pay must necessarily go down because of u1creased
competition among the carriers. This is currently the situation n
the majority of the wDrld's trade.
Current Market Trends
The bulk t<rades have suffered greatly because of the world-
wide economic depression. Dry bulk overtonnage is now acute, and
some shipping economists expect this state to continue into 1984. 15
The greatly decreased demand for oil because of conservation measures
and moves towards alternative fuels has led to an even greater Dver-
tOlmage of tankers (see. Figure 2). The conventional wisdom is that
0ver 153 million tons of tanker capacity is surplus and that the
only hope for a market equilibrium is to accelerate scrappinp, -
however bad the scrap market (see Figure 3).16 Based on past
speculation and the long lead times required to build new ships
there is ae. tuaJ~y mDre tonnage cOnLing on to the market" Uan going
off which will further compound the problem in future years (set'
Tables 9 and 10).
The only bulk trade tlwt has a comparitively good future ·s
the coal export business, especi,3.1ly from the U. S. A. !"Ry the end of
th~ century," predicts Carl E. Bilgp,c of the National Coal Association,
1'9
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TABLE 9
WORLD BULK. G.AJU!IE.R nEET AND FUTURE D£LIV!:JlIES (a)'END-DECEMBER 1982
NUMBER OF SHIPS
FUTURE SCHEDULED DELIVERlE.S
SHIP SIZE CURRENT
FLEET 1ST HALF I 2ND HALF 1ST HALF 2ND HALF 1ST HALF 2ND HALF TOTAL1983 1983 1984 1984 1985 1985 ON ORDER
I
10- 14,999 277 3 I - - - - - ~
IS- 19,999 774 9 3 1 - - - I 1320- 24,999 598 9 6 4 3 2 3 27
25- 29,999 86~6 41 12 10 5 4
-
72
30- 34,999 414 31 22 5 2 1
-
61
35- 39,999 409 47 28 12 4 3' 4 98
I
40- 49,999 287 37 18 29 8
'" '"
I 92I50- 59,999 264 15 7 3 - - . 25
60- 69,999 258 63
I
41 13 6 4 1 128
70- 99,999 164 11 8 4 3 - I 27
100-124,999 102
I
1
- - - - -
I
125,000+ 93 17 9 4 3 -.
-
33
TOTAL 4,506 284 154 85 34 14 9 580
Of Whieh 235 5 . 1 3 - - 9Ora Carri.r.
CUMULATIVE
I
4,506 I 4,790
4,944 5,029 5,063 5,077 . 5,086
ITOTAL
(a) Excluding .peel.li••d v•••• l. eoaflnad to Gr.at Lak•• tr.ding.
Source: Drewry SS&E
TAKEN FRON: u.S., Department of Transportation, Haritime Administration. "ll.S. 'Xaritime
Industries Today," ~\lashington, 1.983. (mimeographed)
N
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TABLE 10
WRLD TANKER FLrn AND FUTURE DELIVERIES, AS AT.- EfclD-DECEH1JER 1982
--_..._--
NUMBER OF SHIPS
FUTURE SCHEDULED DELIVERIES ISHIP SIZE CUlUlENT I
Dill' n:E.ET IS~ HALF I ~ND HALF ' 1ST KALF 2ND HALF 1ST HALF! Z'ND HALF TOTAL
1983 1983 1984 1984 1985 1985 ON ORDER
I
- I
10- 19,999 I 347 18 1 2 11 1 8 41
I20- '29,999 431 15 5 4 7 - - 31
30- 49.999 529 37 17 I 9 4 1 3 n
I
50-69,999 305 22 9 2 4 2 2 4l
70- 99,999 416 17 4 - 2 1
·
24
100-124,999 I il4 6 - 1 1 - I - 8
125-174,999 196
- -
. I
-
-
I
- -
17:5-224,999 7'S
- - - -
II
- ·
-
225-2'99,99.9 444 1 1
- - - ·
2 I
300,000+- llS 2 - - - - - 2
ToTAL 2,975 llS 37 18 29 5 13 , 220
CUKU1.ATIVE
TOTAL 2,975 3,093 3.130 I .3,148 3.H7 3.182 3,195
-
Source: Drewry SS&E
TAKEN FRO)1: U.s, Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, "'U.S.
Maritime Indust r-ie:s Today," v.'ashington 1983,. (mimeographed)
"coal could be this. nation's largest export commodity, adding more
than $15 billion in today's dollars to our balance of payments.,,17
The. liner trades· have a] so fel t t[le effects of the \vorld-
\vide economic depression although to a lesser degree than the bulk
trades. The biggest value cargoes are those that are containerizable.
According to Charles T. Hiltzheimer, chairman and chief executive
oEficer of Sea Land Industries Investments, Inc., containeri7!'able
trades only account for about 3~% of an annual seaborne world trade
of some- 3.6 b"illion tons - but account for some 41% of the value of
all seaborne cargoes. Hiltzhei.mer also forecasts a S% annual growth
rate over the next five years (from 1981) for four of the world's
six largef3t and most developed oceanbornc container shipping trades
between: As-La - North America; Europe - North America; and Europe -
Asia. Of the four major North American container trades, Hiltzheimer
projects the fastest growing over the next five years as the North
America - Asia trades with growth for u.s" cOrltainerizabJe exports
to the Far East expected to average as much as 6.5% between 1980
18
and J986.
Ship Types to Meet Commercial Needs
Based on the market trends, a ship operator. espec~~lly in the
bulk trades, is likely to seriously consider not even building any ne\>,'
ships except to replace older, ineffic.ient ones currently orerat"ng.
At the end of 1982 there were some 100 million dead wei8ht tons of
24
indctive shippln~ in the world (see figure 4). Looking ahead to
the future, needing t.o replace older ship!'l, ship operators are still
building n.ew ships and trying to do so at as much savings as possible.
Ship technology has advanced in many diverse directions. in
recent years. '\Ihile average and maximum ship s' ze continue to
increase in some trades, such as coal; tanker and other bulk carrier
sizes have started to qecline as the avera e trading distance has
declined. In fact, the market tor very Inrge and ultra-large tankers
(VLCC' sand ULCC' s) 'has all but cvapor:a ted. On ,the- other hand,
container, RO!RO and specialized carriers continue to be huilt \-lith
d 1 · . . . bId 19very gra ua lncreaSes In carrYlng capaclty ut ower spec s.
'Major technological issues presently confrenting international
shipping, include:
(1) energy conservation by use of energy-efficient hulls
and power plants; nnd
(2) new ship designs and arrangements that are both energy
efflci'ent and also efficie.nt carriers of specialized caroo or cargo
in specific physical form. Some examples Bre hi~h-volume container-
ships and RO!RO vessels. 20
Another important issue in the design of merchant ships is
the changing role, operation, and technology of ports, port approaches,
cargo transfer methods, and interfacing transport needs. 21
25
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The design of a particular ship will affect the operatin~
costs, such as crew si~e, fuel and cargo handling requirements. the
(Contra of operating costs will often determine whether or not a ship
Hill be' pro . table even if the' correct ship type is operatinr. on Cl
profitable trade route.
Besides the type and operating costs of future me~chant
vesse s, the numbers of U.S. flag vessels needed to carry a "fair
share" of U.S. oceangoing trade has also been the subject of
considerable debate and spcculatio~. Most of the majo£ U.S. oil
companies own about 40% of the tonnage needed to carry their crude
and refined product, most of which is currently under flags of
convenience. Accor.ding to Admiral Harold Shear, }~ritime Administrater,
of the 4,700 dry bulk card erR in the WOI: d fleet only 15 Ely the
American flag. 22 ~~ile this statement sounds very detrimental to
u.S. flag shipping inte.rests, coal industry interests claim that if
U.S. coal exports were carried on U.S. flag vessels, the cost would
add $20-$40 a ton to the delivered price. 23 If 50% carriage of U.S.
goods ;is to be the goal of U.S. shipping, MARAn has projected that
by 1990 there must be approximatelY 400 liners, 200 tankers, and 1,000
cLry bulk vessels under the U.S. flag (see figure 5). Some naval!
maritime strategists, such as Rear Admiral George h'. Miller, USN
(ret.), have estimated this requirement, as high as 5,000 ShiPS.24
27
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It 1s unlikely given current market trends and overtonna~e
S HUB tions that such a merchant ship build ill!?' program is n. ikely to
take place in the United States. Indeed, looking at Third QIJarter
1982 statistics of projected construction in U.S. shipyards to iscal
year 1987, a total of 22 ships are scheduled to be built (see Table 11).
l'here are, however, considerably more pote.nt ia1 U. S. f~ag ships being
built in foreign ship yards because of construction cost savings but
nat at the pace required to meet 1990 estimates for a U.S. flag fleet
capable of carrying 50% of U.S. trade.
A good example of the way the shipping industry is planning
for toe future was given by Charles I. Hiltzheimer of Sea-Land
Industries before the Joint Maritime Congress on June 15, 1982.
Sea-Land is the only liner company in the United States actually
k · f" h b . d' 25rna ~ng a pro ~t W1t out government su S~ 1es.
Mr. Hiltz.heimer's plan for n competitive U.S. liner fleet,
capable of carrying 40% of U.S. foreign liner commerce, includes the
fol owing major pointR:
First, the industry needs to replace the approximately
100 vessels that must be retired hy 1.9'90. This will require
construction of 40 to 45 new, competitive vessels at an
estimated cost of about 1. 8 hillion in today's doUars. The
potential savings achieved in operating cost efficiencies
alone are estimated to be $350 million/year.
Second, if the industry objective is to attain a 40 percent
share of current U.S. foreign liner tl:"ade, it would require
approximately 60 percent capacity increase or 35-50 additional
new competitive container vessels at a CORt estimated to he
29
TABLE II
CONSTRUCTION FOR U.S. PRIVATE SHIPYARDS
-----~--~---'--------~_.--~...-~=------------..",.,
The Maritime Administration anticipates the following merchant ship
construction contract awards in the FY 1983 - FI 1987 period. Thus far,
no new contracts have been placed with U.S. private shipyards in FY 1983
which began October 1, 1982.
~~~~~~~1.!:.~£!i.~!1 !'.~~.!i} FY'84 FY;eS ~r~~ FY'B7 TOTAL-----~- '"'=------ ----- ----~
Tankers
----~---
T-30* 7 2 2 11
T-35 1 3 4
T-60 1 2 .3
~!.y_!t~!.!~
DYB-50 1 1
DYB-120 1 1
.Q!.y~~~~
RO/RO-S 2 2
8 6 7 1 22
T-30
T-35
T-60
DYB-50
pYB-120
RO/RO-S
30,000 DWT tanker
35,000 DWT tanker
60,000 DWT tanker
50,000 DWT dry bulk carrier
120,000 DWT dry bulk carrier
- Approximately 4QO-foot roll-on/roll-off ship
* Five of the 11 30,000 DWT tankers are for charter;: t.o t.he Military
Sealift Command.
SOURCE ~ Shipbuil ders Council of America, Statistical Oua·rte.rly,
\oJashington, D.C., Third Duarter 1982.
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about 2.] billion. This capacity could generate an
additional 3.0 million io revenue and should produce
300-350 million in operating profit annually (using
10-12 percent margin as standard).
Third, the liner industry wouLd need to build additional
capacity to accomodate growth and m:'l.inta in market sllare.
Conservatively, I:hi8 would requi.r·e an additional 40-55
new, competitive vessels estimated to cost 2.4 billion.
Additional revenue provided would he about $3.3 billion
with earnings potential of another 330-400 millinn. 26
This plan is summarized in Tahle 12.
Mr. Hiltzheimer also gave an example gf the type of
vessel needed to achieve these goals. F~rst, sizing UP the
ships currently in the liner fleet, he estimates that about 60
percent of existing ships are too smaLl to be competitive in
foreign commerce (using a yardstick of 500-600 FEU capacity as
minimum) (see Figure 6). Also, current power pl;';lpt techrrolor,y
(steam) is fuel inefficient and average fleet age is high (see
Figure 7).
Sea-Land has developed a competitive vessel profile -
using cost per space mile standards. The cost per space mile
standard is determin£d by three elem€nts:
vesSel fuel cost;
vessel ope~ating cost;
vessel capital cost.
Operating cost per space mile (the cost of movinK one 40-
foot box· one. mile) for the U. S. liner fleet is estimated to be
27between 12 and 15, cents.
31
TABLE 12
COMPETITIVE U.S. LINER FLEET ~ 1990
CAPACITY CAPABILITY - 40% U.S./FOREIGN I~NER COMMERCE
(1982 DOLLARS)
Vessel Requirements
Retain from current fleet
New vessels
TOTAL
Capital Requirements
New vessels
COfit~ainers, equipment
TOTAL
Reveoue Potential •
Earnings Potentiel
76
105-150
181-226
$6.3 billion
$2.3 billion
$8-9 bilUon
$10-11 billion/year
1 hillion/year
SOURCE: Charles 1. Hi1tzheimer. II Improving the Operating
Ef ficiency of the U. s. Flag Me rchant Marine, '" Trans_port 2000,
(July/August 1982). p. A-8.
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(July/August 1982) p. A-3.
33
Today's competition foreign containerships operating
n U.S. trades - operate at an estimated cost of bet'IATeen 7 and
2810 cents per space mile.
Tomorrow's competitive cost is estimated to avC'ra~E'.
29between 5 and 7 cents per spacE'. mile.
In addition, competitive cost differentials will become
greater as fuel. costs escalate. Therefore, the size (container
carrying capacity) of U. S. flag liner ve...,sels mast be increased
substantially and must employ fUE'.l efficient power plants (.low-
speed diesels). 30 In Mr. Hiltzheimer's estimation the competitiv,e
liner vessel of t-he future \d11 cont-ain the following characteristies:
1,000-1,500 40-foot container equivalents.
18-20 knot service speed.
powered by fuel efficient slow-speed dieselR.
constructed at;; competitive capital cost per slot
(30,000-40,000) •
competitive manning levels and reasonab e crew cost -
(20-25 men) . .11
Almost as il testimony to this line of reas·oning, Marine.
Eng;ineering Log" a leading maritime trade journal, gave its 47th
Annual Distinctiv~ Ship Award, in December, 1982, to the first of
the three largest U. S. -b,uilt containerships - Pres_i_dent Lincoln.
The details gf the Pre~Jdent Lincoln read almost identic.ally tIC'
~1r. Hiltzheimer's prescription:
34
- rower plant - 12-cycle, slm.,r-speed diesel eng· nes;
- speed, design draft - 25 knots;
to,t a1 oContait'ler c:apad ty - 2,500 TEU (1,125 FEU) 32
'The prescription \.,ra5n' t followed entirely wi th the Pxesident
Linc.oln, however, as Marc Felice, Editor and Publisher of Tr~_nsport
2000, was quick to point out in a December, 1982, editorinl:
The y~resident Lincoln, and he two sisterships -
Pr,esiden t Washington and President Monroe (scheduled to
be operational in the first ha f of 1983) - cost approxi-
mate y $330 mi Uion to build. If 'constructed in a
shipyard outside the United States, the total cost for
all three vessels would have come to $150 million, ,accordiIlg
to the Maritime Subsidy Board, which authori~ed that sum in
construction differential subsidy so that the ships could
be constructed in an American yard. This, of course, left
API., after having expended an equal amount, with the
additional cost of $30 million for "huilding American."
It also meant a construction time of almost four years at
the Avondale Shipyard: in New Orleans when it would have
taken only about 18 months in. a foreign yard." .
... Further adding La the complications of maintaining
an all-American operation each of the three new APL vessels
will have a union-mandated crew of 34, while European
.containerships of similar size and efficiency are manned
by crews that do Rot exceed 24 men. 33
Mr. Felice hat> effect.ively summed up the major problems
Gf the U.S. shipping industTy. Basically, the U.S. know-how is
still there when it comes to making a profit in shi.pping; but
given the prohibitive costs of building, owning and operating ."1
merchant vessel under the American flag, this "know-howlt means
build !forei,gn and go where the regulations are more favo17Rhle -
3.5
-lags Df convenience. This high cost has done more to reduce
the size of the U.S. flag merchant fleet than any other factor.
Facing the other cost factors, sHch as higher hunker fuel prices
etc., which are affecting the induRtry worldwide, has naturally
lead to the construction of larger ships to take advantage of
economies of Hcale, The larger containerships now being built are
still very dependent on finding enough cargo to reali~e these
economies of scale and will hav·e to eventually reach some
limitations on size and numbers to avoid the situation currently
present in the tanker trades. U.S. shipowners will continue to
place orders only for specific ships needed for a specific purpose
with an eye only to reducing costs and maximizing revenue and
profits. The other purpose for U.S. flag shipp~ng, national
defense, while pressed forth as one of the major reaS.DI1S Eor more
U.S. flag vessels by U.S. sh·pping Interests. is ~sually given the
same treatment as Mr. Hilt7.heimer gave it in his June Jl5, 1982,
address mentioned earlier. Mr. HiJtzheimer said,
"space \viLl not allow me to deal with the vital support 4
role of our merchant marine in th:e national dej:'ense CQFltexr'.'
This is quite understandable to anyone who has studied the milit£lry
requirements for merchant vessels to meet wartime contingencies
because Mr. Hiltzheimer's new .super containership prescription is
a dose of bad medicine to most military planners. The military
certainly has its own needs and requirements and has been quite
frank making these reg uiremen ts knmvn.
36
Military. Requirements
Major military deployment plans involve moving cQfnbat
forces to Europe in the classic NATO-Soviet Bloc confrontation
scenario, to KoreLl, or to Southwest Asia, depending on where the
35trouble breaks out.-
I\.ccording to Vice Admiral Carroll:
In all these plans, about 95% of dry cargo mURt go by
sea; only 5% goes by air. Sealift is even more vital for
fuel deLivery. More than 99% must go by sea, and tonnage-
wise, mo~e fuel must be moved than all dry cargo by air
and sea combined. Rememher the old axiom about the Army
traveling on its stomach? Well, today that might be re-
written to read: our military forces travel on their fuel
tanks. 36
At the heart of the problem is exactly how the commercial
merchant vessels will be used to support a NATO or U.S. only
operation. and if there are enough vessels of the prope-r type to
do the job.
The NATO-Soviet Bloc scenario
The wartime requirements and estimate of the number of
mercha.Qt vessels needed to carry th.at 95% of mil.itary carg0 are
staggering when compared to what js actually available. It has
been ,est imated that the NATO alliance requires between 2, SOO ;m~l
6,000 merchant bottoms in order to fulfill its ogistical
"bU" 37~e$pOnSL 1tles. Rough estimat.es suggest that more than 10
million tons of cargo and over 110 million barrels of liquid
37
would have to be transported across the Atlantic il11 the first
180 days of conflict to support North Americnn troops nm" in
Europe and their reinforcements. These f1 ures do not, however,
inc 1ude resupply of European forces which wi l:1L aise need supplie's
and military equipment. NQr do these figures include civilian
needs in Europe. .Potential losses of merchant vessels during
wartime resupply missions must also be added to the equat1on. 38
Well over a third and probably more of the merchant ships
at sea would be destroyed or preven~ed from deliver'ng tlLelr
cargoes on the day shooting started. Reasonable estimates
suggest 15-30% Losses during the first month of a conflict with
. 39the average rate of losses declining over ~ protracted perloct.
It is also very important to only consider the ships that;
are available nm.. when thinking in terms of NATO requirements
because as Colonel Frank B. Case, USA (ret), a NATO wartime shipping
planner put it,
"World ll1ar III will be a come-as-you are party. The
United States won't have a Bri.tish shield to mobilize
behind. The ships that will count in the next war
\..111 be the Rhips a float the day the war s.tartS. ,,40
There are approximately 7,240 ships in the NATO merchant
fleet which account for 31.7% of the world's merchant fleet (see
Table 13). Approxim~tely 3,100 of these ships are geneTa cargo
and containerships (see Table 14). Because of the minimal military
38
TABLE 13
World Merchant Fleet: Mi,d-1981
Number Million
Groups of Ships % GRT %
NATO 7,240 31.7 147.60 37.9
COMECON' 3.,060 13.4 24.00 6.2
Flags of ConvenIence 5,290 .23.2 109.30 28.1
Non·N ATO OECO.countries 2,660 11.7 52.70 13.5
I Pcopl'e'.s Republit qf China 740 3.2 7'.25 1.9
Others 3,830 16.11 48.15 12.4
TOTAL 22,820 100.0 389.00 100,0
REMARKS:
Fi~ufcs include ships of 1,600 grt and ov~r. but exclude fish factories and ,arrie~, fishing
ve!-~els, supply ships and le,nders, tugs, dredgers, icebreakers, rC!oCarch ships, Olnd mi~cel·
lancous (non.trading);
NATO indudes france;
COMECON figures include: Albania, Bulga'ria, Cuba, Clechoslova·kia, German Democratic
I Republic, Hungary. Poland, Romania and U.S.S.R.;
Figures of Flags of C;;onvenicnce repreJ,ent: liberia, Panama, Sing~pore, Cyprus and
6ermuda;
Non-N ATO.countries within DECO: AIJstralia, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Japan, N'ew
Zeal'l.I1d, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. (Spain has since joined NATO.)
Sour,e: Lloyd's Register of Shipping: "StD/is/ical Tables 1981, ,. London. ~I
TABLE 14
World General Cargo I Containership Fleet
'Groups Number % Million
of Ships G~T
NATO 3,100 26.1 28.55
COMECON 2,160 18.2 11.80
Flags of Convenience 2,565 21.6 16.35
Non·NATO
o ECO -Cou ntries 1,110 9.3 7.60
People's Republic
of China 515 4.4 3.75
Olhers 2,420 20.4 16.95
WORLD 11 ,8:~O 100.0 85.00
REMARKS:
% Average
GRT
33.6 9,200
13.9 5,450
19.3 6,350
8.9 6,850
'I
4.4 7,250'
19.9 7,001)
100.0 7,150
General Cargo & Container ships of 1,600 GRT lind over;
NATO includes France;
COMECON figures ,include: A IlI.mia , Bulgiria, Cuba, CzechosI9vak;a, Germ.ln Democratic
Rcpublic,llungiry, Pola,nd, Romania, and U.S.S.R.;
Figures of F·lags of Convenience rcpresent: liberia, Paoama, Singapore, Cyprus, and
Bermuda;
Non·NATO.counlries wilhin O[CD: Australia, Austria, Finland, .Ireland!, Japan, New
Zealand, Spain, Sweden, and Swinerland. (Spain has since joined N ATO.)I
Source: Lloyd'5 Rfgislt!f of Sh{pping: "S/afislit;al Tobles HUJI.·· London.
SOURCE: Karl-Heinz Sager,
Their Imp1icat"on on Defense,"
p. 40.
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"NATO Merchant Fleets - Current Trends and
Transport 2000, (July - August 82).
usefulness of flags o.f convenience vessels, they arc not p,eneralJy
considered for planning purposes. Therefore, it app~ars that i.'
the estimate of 6000 ships to resupply U.S. forces alone is correct,
it would represent about 83% of the NATO merchant fJeet. Some
mi litary planners consider 6000 ships to be an order 0.£ mag'nitude
too high and estimate that dry cargo tonnage to deploY' reinforce-
ments would be less than the annual liner trade of the United
S . . 41tates 10 peacetlme. This disparity has been caused largely hy
can usjon between ships needed and sea-lifts needed. Planners
estimate the number of loads needed to sustain troops which does
not translate directly into the number of ships needed. Even
taking potential losses into account, it is reasonable to aSRume
that a portion of the ships will make several tri'Ps. NATO
Europe811 A les have earmarked some 600 cargo vessels specl f ical ly
for NATO reinforcement. The United States could count on at least
40() NA "'0 I l' ... f f . 4 2l\L poo S llpS to aSsIst In relonorcel'lent 0., lots troops.
The NATO requirement aod its contin.ual flood of statistics of
\.Jhat NATO has versus \oJhat NATO needs 1.s sip,nj ficctnt for another
reason. Ove.r the last decade U.S. military planners have concen-
trated almost exclusively on NATO in Western Europe. That focus
has been on the short tvar approach - defending successfully ap.:ajnst
fl1ll3ssive Warsaw Pact sur?>e in 8 fetv weeks. Emphasis Ivas placed on
the huild up of combat power in the early time frame of einforc.ement
40
which has meant concentrating largely on airlift and, over tbe
i l ]last decade, prepositioning massiv€ amounts of mate·rials in EurDpe. -
This concentration on a NATO short war has masked the need fa
adequate sealift resources to meet contingencies elsewhere in tke
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world.
l'he.se other cont.:Lngenciesare not near. y as we' defined in
unclass·ified terms as. the potential NATO~Harsaw Pact conflict.
The United States has in recent years developed extensive plans
for a rapid deployment force which is structuTed for meeting a
va ie.ty of contingencies anywhere in the world.
Rapid Deployment Force
The Rapid Deployment Force grew out of a study conducted 'n
1977 which highlighted the need fol:' a faull-service force \"h1ch COlit d
deploy for contingencies outside NATO and Korea. The study culminated
in the establishment of a force to project U.S. power I:'apidly.45
The area currently receiving the most attention is Southwest Asia,
including the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Distances involved
are staggering - over 7.000 miles by air from the U.S. East CQast to
che Persian Gulf area; by sea, over 8,000 miles from the East Coast
via Suez Canal, and, if the canal is closed. over 12,000 miles
d Af ' 46aroun rJca.
The logistics goal is to provide a capahility ~o maintain
equipment and supplies fol:' three ulechanized marine amphibious
41
brigades. A near term (pre-positioned) force will contain the
equipment for one brigade as follows:
51 - tanks
361 - M-60 machine guns
86 - TOH missiles
16 - HAWK" missiles
188 - RRDEYE missiles
I - 8 in. Howitzers eSP)
11 155mm Howitzers
7 - lS5mm Howitzers (SP)
32 -
4,6 -
51 -
4."3 -
1.25 -
86 -
4 -
170
l05mm Howitzers
60mm Mortars
M20 HPFH
81rom Horta,rs
LV']'
Dragons
l75nnn guns
k ( . )47true s or:l eeps
Resides dry cargo and equipment needs, one of the most critical
logistics problems in this area is the requirement for large
quantities of refined oil products, such as gasoline and av'ation
fuels. 110st of the ocean going tankers under U.S. control are
crude oil cnrriers, not well suited for cHrrying refined products.
Most sui tab e tankers are engaged in dOr.lestic trade and probably
could not be spared in numbers sufficient to the task of supporting
48
major long range developments. o 19RO and 1981 the Military
Seali.£t Command had to spot-charter l55 clean fuel oil tankers,
96 of which were foreign flag, because they were unavailable from
the U.S. merchant marlne. 49
As this example illustrates, just having a Aufficient number
of ship~ is in most cases, not enough. 'fhe type of ships needed to
support military operations now and in the future has also been
the subject of much planning, often without t'3king into account the
ships industry .is planning to build, such as Hr. Hilt:lheimer1s 150
super-containerships.
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Ship Tlpes to Meet Milit~ry Requirements
If military planners had their way, notbing hut RO/RO's
. h b b '1 50m~g t e Ul t. RO/RO ships are characterized 8S lar~e~ fast
Slves~els with large, open decks and high vertical cle.qrances.
rhe advantages of Roll Co/Roll Off ships to military planners are
considerable. The advantages include:
ability to easily handle wheeled and tTacked military
effectiveness in transporting oversize/overweight"
cargo quickly and efficiently;
load planning is simpler and has more flexibility,
allowing for eas~er adjustments to loading priorities and
load composition;
at the receiving ports, RO/RO ships provide easi~r
accesS to cargo, faster unloading, and morc rapid turnaround,
thus reducing vulnerability in the overseas theater and
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a lowing for more trlps by the vessel.
The only requirement to make the vessel fully useable in
the overseas theater is the berthings must have a pier of suitRhle
height and \",idth fDr the side ramps to re.st upon and lm,ler pier or
[ . 53ramp or stern ramp operat1on.
A second type of ship which militat:y planners can make
good use of is the barge carryinR vessel which is an ocean Raing
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vessel capable of carrying a Small fleet of barges. There arc:
two general types of barge carriers; the LASH (Lighter-Aboard~
Sbip) and the SEABEE (Sea>=RaTge). 'the LASH can lift up to 89
barges into cellular spaces by means of an onboard gantry crane.
LASH barges have' a load capacity which exceed 400 tons. The
SEAB~E has a 2,000 ton capacity elevator to lift barges out of
the water ,nod onto one of three decks where a transporter dolly
posi~ions them horizontally. 54
Both LASH and SEABEE classes are well suited for trans-
porting mi~itary equipment. The SEABEE class is the better of
the two because of its barge size and its ability to handle
5S
military cargo, such as helicopters, without rna'; or disassembly. '
The extensive crane support needed to load cargo from lighters
56
or barges is seen as one major disadvantage.
Breakbulk vessel!'> have been the most widely used for
military deployments. These ships are very flexible and can
handle outsized, heavyweight Army vehicles, such as tanks. Break-
bulk ships c.an transport different types of cargo and hnve the
ca,pabilit1 to load and discharge cargo using self~contaioed cranes. 57
This self-contained crane feature also makes it possible for
breakbulk vessels to call at austere and possihly war dama ed
parts which may h..ave little or no shore based off- oadin?, equipment.
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Finally, there are containerships which have proven to be
very east .effective to the liner industry. T.hese ships, unfortunately,
are generally cGnsideTed unsatisfactory for military unit depl.oymell.ts
h f . I· b' . d 58because muc 0 a unlt S equlpment cannot e conta1Fler1ze . T.ank~ ,
recovery vehicles, combat engineer vehicles, hrirlge launchers, and
self-propelled artillery pose the most serious problems for tranRport
on containerships. For example, when considering square fQot area,
the tank battalion is 15 percent containerizable, the' 155inm self-
pEopellecl artillery battalion 19 percent containerizable, and the
coniliat enRineer battalion 13 percent containerizable. 59 Estimates
for other military units are ShOWiI1 in Table 15. It is important to
note that the heaviest divisions, such as tanks, will be the ones
to require more sealift versus airlift and are the divisions
least adaptable to container~7.ation. ARy vehicles and aircraft
that are containerized will require much time to disassemble and
then be reassembled at the deba~kation point, a delay that may not
60be tolerable.
Military planners are quick to identify one other serious
deficiency with containerships - the lack of self-contai ned
cranes. Crane.s are n.ot installed on the newer containerships
because of the loss of reverme from the space a crane takes (less
space for containers) and from the extra wei~ht of cranes] eatling
to higher fuel consumption. This lack of on board cranes makes
45
,TABLE 15
PERCENTAGE OF CONTAINERIZARLE EQUIPME~T
Square Measurement
Unit Feet % Tons %
Airborne Division 62.7 50 ..,
Airmobile Division 49.2 33.0
Armored Division 28.8 20.4
Infantry Division 41. 4 30.8
Mechanized Division 29.5 21.0
NOTE 1: 40 ft standard container used
NOTE 2: Figures are significant ly lmver if the unit vehicles
are nut containerized.
SOURCE: Scott Bergeron, CAPT. USA, "Deployment on Containerships:
Panacea or Paradox?", Tra~s~o~, (February 1982) p. 9.
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it necessary to off J.oad a containership only at \vell developed,
modern container facilities located primarily in major ports of
developed coun t rie s. Mas t develop i ng coun t rie s a"fe .i lIS t. beginning
to become participants in the containerized trades and therefore
lack the modern port facilities necessary fo~ container operations.
Anothe,r factor is that since port cities in the past have heen
important military targets, container ofE-loading port facilities
could sus.tain considerable damage, especially in the NATO-Soviet
Bloc senario.
There is, however, still a use Eor containerships \vith
an estimated 23 average sized ships needed to support u.s. Army
meehanized division (sec Table 16).
Summary and Compar:Lson of Mil:iLtary and Industry Needs
In summary, sealift is a very important aspect of military
preparedness for any type of contingency from the NATO--Soviet
confrontat.ion in Northern Europe to rapid deployment force-
operations in the Persian Glll f. It will do very little good to
rapidly airlift personnel and light equipment into a troub e area
if the mi 1lion8 of tons ot supplies necessary to Sllstain such an
operation cannot be delivered. The induBtry is huilding container-
Bhips~ while military planners are saying that only about one-half
of military equipment is containerizable. The military says it wants
47
TABLE 16
NATIONAL CONTAINERSHIP SEA-SHED LOAD
FOR A U,S. ARMY MECHANTZED DIVISION
-
FY 80 Equipment FV 86 Equipment
,-._-
Containerships 22 23
Sea-Sheds 630 ARO
TEU Con ta i ne. rs 6,778 6,491
Deck Load (ft2 ) 419,790 448,500
SOURCE: Technical Report on "Sea-Shed," RTL Incorporated,
. February, 1980 .
._. ---- ---
SOURCE: Scott Bergeron, CAPT USA, "Deployment on Containerships:
Panacea or Paradox?", Translog, (Feh ruary 1982) p. 7.
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RO/RO's, while the industry says RO/ROls are not very cost
effective and for that reason are noli: building them io sufficient
numbers.
There are a number of possible solutions to this problem.
One answer would be to build IRQ/ROts in sufficient: numbers to
suit military planners. 'Fhe Soviet Union is doing just that.
It is obvious to them that. although RO!RO vessels are seldom as
efficient as containerships, it is their flexibility in hand ing
a wide ran~e of cargo with simple facilities ashore tehat appeals
to the Soviet Navy and makes them an integral part of Soviet
61
strategy. The Soviets certainly can afford to do this because
a nationally owned concern is not: as prof~t-consciouB and dependent
as a private enterprise. If the United States wants the RO!RO's
and breakbulk vessels the military planners say they need, it will
have to he as part of a national fleet, built and operated by the
gove rnmen t . If, hovev,er, the military cargo curren t ly going to
the private sector is carried on a national fleet, it wi 1.1 further
weaken an already troubled industry. Also, since the mili-taTY in
peacetime does not need even close to the number of ship!':l i.t will
need in a general crisis Ri tUil.'ti: ion , much money will either have to
be spent in mothballing and upkeep OT in keeping the ships in
service thereby directly competing with private shipping.
49
Nationali~ation. while if imposed would probably assure the
availability of the necessary ships for national defense, is not
a very practical solution if tile entire shipping industry is taken
into account.
The other alternative is for the military to make the best
possible use of the ships of whatever kind the industry builds
to be profttable in oceangoing trade. This is happen in?, l,rith the
develop~ent of sea-sheds, Elatracks and craneships to make
containerships more useful to the military. Sealift is once
again a major concern in the military as the planners broaoen
their focus to all parts of the world instead of .iust NATO.
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CHAPtER IV
PROGRAMS TO ENHANCE MILITARY SEALIFT CAPABILITIES
Introduction:
Today, the U.S. merchant marine is called the "fourth
62
arm of defense. II \\Jhile the miliLary does own and operate ships
I,
"
of its own during reaeet,:l!.me. ,it does not have all of the merchant
ships it will need ,should a crisis situation occur. For the
additional ships needed in times of crisis the military can rely
on the National Defense Reserve Fleet which can supply additional
eargo carrying capabilities but certaiuly not all that will he
needed. To make up the differences the mil~tary will have to
rely on privately owned U. s. flag merchant vessels, Mlsuming
they are available and of the type~ neces~ary to carry ~ilitary
cargo and fueh. Additionally" ships \vi11 have to be built ra~irlly
to replace merchant vessels that are damaged or destroyed.
Sealift plans must include a capability to get equipment
on the scene rapidly and a capability for long sustained
resupply of combat forces already engaged.
The Navy, through the Military SenlHt Command, has recognized
the crit'cal need for an enhanced sealift capability to meet contin-
gencies wherever they occur and has developed several plans to
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provide a fast sealift capability and make better use of existing
U.S. flag vessels.
These Jl rograms include: buiJI.d and charter tankers, conve r t
and charter maritime preposi.t'on'ng "hips, ast replenishment ships
and modIfications to container vessels to enhance their mi-litary
usefulness.
Military Sealift Command (MSC)
The primary mission of MSC is to provi.de the. se.alift
capability to deploy and sustain military forces anywhere in the
world, as rapidly and as long as op~rational requirements
d · . f' 1 . h' . 63~ctate, In support a natlona secur~ty 0 ~ectlves.
In riseal year 1981. MSC delivered 7.1 mi ion tons of
eargo for the military services. Over 93 percent of all dry
,cargo ~.,ras moved 00 privately owned U.S. flag ships, with 67
percent moving on scheduled cargo liners. MSC also delivered
16.6 fui1lion long tons of petroleum products for the Defense
64Fuel Supply Center and the Strategic Petroleum Reserve ProRram.
At the end of 1982, the fleet controlled by MSC consisted
of 137 ships.65 The controlled fleet is divided Into the nucleus
fleet and the commercial chartered fleet (see Tahle 17). To
augment this nucleus f lee.t there is the National Defense Reserve
Fl,eet (NDRf) ~.,rhich is administered by the Maritime Admin]:stration.
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TABLE 17
INVENTORY OF CONTROLlEO SHIPS
AS OF 3 DEC 19182
72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82
NUCLEUS
- 16.1 1CARGO 75 71 35 26 6 6 6 6 7 11
TRANSPORTS 2
TANKERS 20 17 21 21 21 211 21 21 23 23 21
PROJECT SCIENTIFIC SUPPORT 3S 3S 3S 29 24 24 24 21 22 21 20
FLEET SUPPORT NAVAL flEET
AUXILIARY ·FORCE (NFAF) 5 10 16 17 18 23 27 30 29
-- -- --TOT Al NUCLEUS 132 123 96 8.6 ,67 68 69 71 79 85 86
CHAR,ERED
CARGO 96 49 41 29 28 28 30 28 29 34 30
TANKERS 29 23 20 12 9 Ii 4 5 11 16 15
PROJECT·SCIE,HIFIC SUPPORT 9 9 8 4 4 4 2 3 3 5 5
NFAF 1 2 ,
-- --
TOTAl. CHARTERED 134 81 69 45 41 38 36 36 44 57 51
GENERAL AGENCY AGREEMENT
_.-
= -- -- -- -- -- -- ---TOTAL CONTROLLED 266 204 165 131 108 106 1,05 107 123 142 137
SOURCE': "Military Sealift Cemmand," Defense Transportation
Journal (Annual Report), (February 1983), p. 27.
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Th~ NDRF ~onsists uf about 170 ships, including Ready Heserve
F h · 66'orce S lpS. The only difference hetween the NDRF and Ready
Reserve Force (RRF) ships is the amount of t'me they require to
be brought back into service. Most of the NDRF ships are h'orld
\>Jar II vintage Victory ships and would re.quire ahout 21 to 60
days fo'r activation. Th@ Ready Reserve 'Force is made up of the
best and most useful ships of the NDRF and can :be activated in
67five to reo days. The Navy p~an.s to have 40 ships in the RRF by
fiscal year 1986 with an eventual goal of 77. 68
These ships, under control of the Military Sealift
Command, are not enough to meet military needs in times of crisis.
There will be some augmentaC-ion from the EUSC feet but, sillc,e the
majority of this fleet is crude oil carriers and bulkers, only a
few ships are militarily useful. The rest of the ships needed
will have to come from the U.S. flag merchant marine.
Augmentation From the Commercial Fleet
Besides direct charter of commercial vessels by NSC, there
is a voluntary contractual arrangement between MSC and u.s. ship
operators that carry def'ense cargo in peacetime and to all ships
for which Federal subsidies are paid. This arrangement is knmm
as the Sealift Readiness Program (SRP) whereby the Secretary of
Defense and the Secretary of Transportationiointly may approve
call-up of ships under the program. 69
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U~der Section 902(a) of the Merchant Marine Act of ]916,
the President may authori7.e the. requis't~Qnin8 of U.S. flap: shipR
and ships o\o,'11ecl by U.S. citizens which are registered under
foreign flags whenever he determines that the security of the
national defense makes it advisable or during any period of
. 1 70nat1Qna emergency.
WhiJ e a1] the· rules seem to be in place and t"he ~ational
Shipping Authority occasional y exercises the procedures necessar~
to affect requisitioning commercial ships when required, there
are sti 1 gaps in U.S. sealift readiness lar~ely due to the sma
numbers and unsuitability of U.S. flag merchant vessels.
The Navy, through the MQlitary Seal'Ft Command, has
begun recently to fill these gaps through several sealift
readiness programs and several programs to make the best
possi.hle use of commercial ships likely to he avaU:lble in the
future.
Sealift Enhancement Programs
MSC is steadily lIpgrO'iding and expanding its nucleus
fleet. through progra,ms such as "bui ld and charter r" Build and
charter is a program where the Navy specifies the' type of ships
l~eded - thoSe not available io the merchant marine - and private
investor;s arrange for construction on the hasi.s of a commitment
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to ch;:trter the ships. Once the ships are operating, the Navy
pays the cost of the service provided at a neRotiated charter
rate. The rate covers cost of construction and financing, plus
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a reasonable profit for the owners. As of Jartuary, 1983, two
construction contracts had been awa~ded subject to congressional
approval, for constr.uction of T-S tanker replacement ships of
25,000 to 30,000 deadweight tons, under the build and charter
. -1 . f h 72program, Wltl optLons or t Tee more.
Another plan is the Convert and Charter !'o1ar itime Prenosi-
honing Ship (T-AKX) Program. This prograpl involves convertinr-
existing merchant ships to multipurpose ships able to carry
diverse cargo from containers, breakbulk, and RO!RO carfoes.
The conversion process will include addition of special carRO
stowage features and cargo-handlin~ systems which will permit
rapid discharge with or without developed port facilities.
These converted T-AKX ships will have the capability to Rupport
f Of If' lOb' b· d 73one 1 t loa mar~ne amp n ·10US r1Ra e. There are also
planB for new construction of T-AKX ships which v..ill he of ;I
slightly different desip;n emphasizing the fundamental "\<.'are-
housing" requirements for maritime prepositionin? o' material
and supplies as well as special cargo-handling systemS required.
'Jibe new ,construction T-AKX will provide the capacity to surport
7 l,
onc fourth of a marine amphibious brigade.
General Dyna~ics,
Final Dptions for chartering the last si~ of 13 maritime
prepositioning ships were signed on January 14, 1981. 75 The
ships will carry enou~h cargo to support three IDRrine amphibious
brigades, a total of 46,000 men. The total l3-s~ip packar,e for
£ ' ! 1 1 $171'11' 76lve year c larters tota S Ileal" Y • ''1 .J.on,
Quinc.y, Mass., wi 1 build five new ships; !'1:aelrsk 1.i ne, Ltd., New
York, will convert five ships at Bethlehem Steel Corp., in
Baltimore, Md., and Beaumont, Texas, anJ Waterman SteamShip Corp.,
Ne~' York, will convert three ships at National Ste.el ancl Shiphuildin~
C S D ' 770., . an lego. The first ship will be delivered in August, 19R4,
and the last ship by April, 1986. The ships will he operated for
MSC under long- term chaners by U. s. flag ship operatin~ firms
using U.S. merchant marine crews. 78
The T-AKX program will enable marines to be airlifted to
the- trouble spot, marry up with the equipment prepositioned at
sea, and then proceed to the objective area. This would be one
way around the staggering logistics prohlem of rapid y supplying
and sustaining combat forces deployed far: fr:om home in areas
~herc they have little or no prepesitioned materials on land or
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assurance of host nation support.
The Navy also recently purchased six large containerships,
tbe SL-7' s, from Sea-Land for about S270 mi ] ion~W (see Figure 8).
These non-selfsuataining containerships will be eventually converted
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FIGURE 8
EXISTIN.G SL-7
CONTAINERSHIP CHA'RACTERISTICS
SOURCE: Department of the Navy, Military
Sea]li f,t Command. "Pas t logistic. Shi..p 'Program
(TAKRX) - Briefing of Industry on Navy
Baseline," 1.Jashington, D. C. 1982 (minreogr<3'phed)
LENGTH OVERALL
,DESIGN D'RAH
PROPUL_SION
MAX SPEED AT
DESIGN DRAFT
946' 1}s"
30'
120,000 SHP
33 KT
B'EAM
UISPU\CEMENT
TOTAL CONTAINERS
105' 6'·
51,'815 IT
1,096
into RO/RO's. After conversion, the SL-7 I s, designated T-!lf[R,
will be able to aecomodate heavy equipment, tanks, and artillery
batteries and have their own ramps, cranes and helicopter pads
(se.e F' gure 9). Eight SL-7' s (T-AKR) can carry a full armored
aT mechanized division with combat service support. And, at a
maxi mum speed of 33 knoJts, can sail to Europe from the U. S. East
Coast in four days or to the P~rsian r,ul£ in about 11 dAyS via
81the Suez Canal. The purpose of these ships will be to provide
a surge capability to get a large amount of equipment ta the
crisis area as quickly as possible. This capability exists to
a certain extent through airlift but ge'tting the heavy equipment
there can only be accomplished through sealift. This important
surge capahi1ity is currently lacking, which is why four of the
eight 5L-7's will first undergo an enhancement program to
provide a very limited capabi~ity as soon as possible (see Figure
10). 'the delivery schedule for the T-AKR1s is shown in Table 18.
During peacetime the T-AKR's will only be operated
several times a year for a few days. Once determined to be
operating satisfactorily, they will be taken hack to port. An
extensive post-conversion operational readiness plan l"as
submitted to the Deputy Chief of Operations on January 7, 1983,
outlining the berthing and upkeep of these ships, takin~ into
account hurricane probabilLties, crewing proposals, administrative
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FIGURE 9
TAKRX NAVY BA'SELINJE
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CONFIGURATION
0-
D
AFT
-
FWD
• CONTAINER CELLS RETAINED EXCEPT 'FOR:
C'RANE FOUNDATION MODS (RESULTS IN 46
20 FT VICE 35 FT CONTAINERS)
- REDUCtiON OF 3 ]5' CONTAINERS IN WAY OF
FIXED RAMP TO HATCH COVERS
• GRATING BETWEEN CONTAINER HATCH: COVERS
- LIGHT ROIRO IDECK, 200 PS,F
- RETAIN CLEAR AREAS OUTBOARD OF IHATCH
COVERS
• 'MODIFY HATCH COVERS
200 PSF DISTRIBUTED CARGO LOAD
- TIE DOWNS
.,' COMPARTMENTATION
- 3 MIDSHIP COMPARTMENTS
• BULKHEADS AT FRAMES 198. 242
• SIX ROIRO DECKS INCLUDING R.IGHT DECK
SOURCE: Department of the Navy, Military
Sealift Command, "Fast Logistic Ship
Program (TAKRX) - Breifing of Industry
on Navy Baseline. tl t,lashington, D. C. 1982
(mimeographed) .
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FIGURE 10
ENHANCEMENT PLAN
SL-7 PRIOR to CONV'ERSION
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PROFILE VIEW
• 106 FLATRACKS (35'L ,x 8'WJ X ',t3.5'H)·
• 16 FLATRACKS (4O'L X 8'W X 8.5'H)
• ,434 CONTAI,NERS BELOW DECK
- 310 (lS'L X 8'W X 8.5'H)
- 124 (4a'L X S'W X 8.S'H)
• 8 SEASHED5
• ON-DECK STOWAGE OF 402 CONTAINERS
- 13.5' REPRESENTS CLEAR HEIGHT FOR CARGO
A - 35' FLATRACKS (35' X r X 1].51-
B - 40' FLATRACKS (CO' X 8' X 8;5')
C ~ 40' CONTAINERS (40' X 8' X 8.S') II
o - 35' CONTAINERS (35' X 8' X 8.S')
E - SEASHEDS (35" X 2S' X 12.5')
SOURCE: Department of the Navy, Military
Sealift Command, "Fast Logistic Ship Program
(TAKRX) - Rriefing of Industry on Navy
Baseline,11 Washington, D.C. 1982 (mimeographed).
TABLE 18
FAST LOGISTIC SHIP (FSl,) PROGRAM T-AKR
Snip
~"USNS ALGOL (T-AKR 287)
(E~ SS Sea-Land Exchange)
1<
USNS ANTARES (T-AKR 294)
(EX 55 Sea-Land Galloway)
,,<
USNS CAPELLA (T-AKR 293)
(~X 58 Sea-Land McLean)
,'<
USNS BELLATRIX (T-AKR 288)
(EX 58 Sea-Land Trade)
USNS REGULUS (T-AKR 292)
(EX 58 Sea-Land Commerce)
U5NS ALTAIR (T-AKR 291)
(EX 55 Sea-Land Finance)
USNS DENEBOLA (T-AKR 289)
(EX 5S Sea-Land Resource)
USNS POLLUX (T-AKR 290)
(EX 5S Sea-Land Market)
Conversion Yard
NASSCO, San Diego
Avondale, New Orleans
PENKSIUP, Chester, Pa.
NASSCO, San Diego
NASSCO, San DLego
Avqndale, New Orleans
PENNSHIP, Chester, Pa.
Avondale, New Orleans
Schedulerl
Delivery Time
30 .JUN 84
30 JUN 84
30 .TUN 84
31 OCT 84
213 FEB 86
28 FEB 86
28 FEB 86
30 JUN 86.
* Ship in yard undergoing conversion.
SOURGE.: Department of the Navy, Military Sea-1ift Command, "Fast
Logistic Ship (FSL) Program/T-AKR," (mimeographed)
Hull numbers and [ormel: Sea Land desginations from Janes Fighting
Ships, p. 683.
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82organization~, etc. These ships will not be used unless the
combat support they can move is needed in a hurry. This if> why
the military is not concerned about the amount or fuel t-he SL-7':::;
(T=AKR) 83use.
The Maritime Prepositioning Ship Program and the SL-7
Fast Sealift Program, when completed, will have mQre than tripled
the current ability to deploy u.s. combat pol'Jer to Southwest
A " 8451-a. These programs, whil "mpressive, are recally only half
t he sol ut ion, however. They give uS the capah i1 ity to trans par t
an initial large amount of material in a relatively short timc,
\vhich Vice Admiral Carroll, Commander Military Sealift Command,
refers to as the "f>urge capability" mentioned earlier. The
other half of the problem is resupply of the for.ces already
engaged in an operation. This is where the U.S. commercial
fleet p .ays the vi tal role. For the surge capability problem
the u.S. merchant marine industry is heavily involved but the
ships being used are for a specific purpose. While the induf>try
will benefit from the construction, conversion, and charter
money, these T-AKX and T-AKR ships must be considered part of
the military the same as destroyers or aircraft carriexs rat-her
tIlan commercial vessels. It is highly unlikely that if these
ships, for some reason, were no longer chartered to the military
that they could or would be used profitably in commercial shipping.
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'rhe other half of the problem, resupply, WLU be up to
the shipping resource.s of the private shippin~ industry. Here
is where the problem of the milit.;lTy Don-suitability of Mr.
lliltz'heimer's super-containerships. must be solved.
Adapting ContainerRhips to Meet Military Needs
As previously mentioned, while the military continues to
highlight the enormous advantages of RO/RO's, BCVts, ane! break~
bulk vessels tor military operations, it is a simple fact that
there are just not enough ships of tll.is type in the U. S. flap,
merchant marine. The reasons for the dominance of large non-self-
sustaining containerships were discussed in Chapter TIl. Military
pJanners recognize this fact and have devel~ped several programs
to make the best possible use of containerships.
One of the biggest problems with containerships is that
a large percentage of the heavy military equipment, that will
have to route by sea, is too large or heavy to be containerized.
To handle outsized equipment sea-sheds and flat racks have been
developed.
Sea-Shed and Flat Rack
The sea-shed concept i» that of a removabLe 'ttoleen deek
or decks in a cellular container hold to provide containerships
with the capability co carry outsize and heavy unit loads, sueh
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as trucks and armored tanks, as well as palletized cargo.
The sea=shed is a large open-top container, 40 feet long x
25 feet wide 'X 12~ feet de~p, with a 1arp,e batch cover in the
floor (see Figure J1). Activation gear for the hatches are
contained in each sea-shed, requiring only an electric power
source for operation. The sea-shed is designed for insertion
into cOIl_tainer hol ds having at least three adj aesot 40~foot
cells closely spaced athwartship. Once in place, the sea-sheds
remain as part of the ship until it is desired to revert back to
container operations. They are installed and removed empty. and
a1] cargo handling is done with the sea-sheds in place (see
Figures 12 and 13).85 This con.cept was successfully tested in
November, 1982, and contracts are being prepared for sea-shed
. 86
constructlon.
The flat rack is a smaller portable 'tween deck which
will fit into a single 40-foot container cell. It is designed
to provide "wing" 'tween dcck stowage in other .container cells
adjacent to the sea-sheds. The flat racks have endw~lls and
cornerposts but no sideJ3. The c.ornerposts !!lURt be the s.ame
height as the sea-sheds, so their floors are level with the
sea-shed floors. There is no opening in the floor of the flat
rack. (see Figure 14). 8/
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FIGURE 11
SEA SHED - GENERAL ARRANGEMENT
SOURCE: Department of Trans~ort~tion,
Maritime Administration, "Sea Sheet.
Removable 'Tween Deck Conve"rsion
System for Containerships, Shoreside
Test November 1, 1982" (Hashington, D.C.
1982) p. 2,
II'I
FIGURE 12
CONTA NERSHIP SHED INSTALLATION
-EXISTING CONTAINER· GANTRY CRANE-
• ,. '. ". f, •..•.
} ESTIMATED TARE WEIGHT- 33sr}
I CR4NE LIFT CAPACITY-40 T. .
102"0"
SCALE-1fl6- '" 1 FT.
SOURCE: Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration,
"Sea Shed - Removable 'Tween Deck Conversion System for Containerships,
Sh.oresicle Test November 1, 1982'1 (t.Jashington, D.C. 1982) p. 3.
67
FIGURE 13
"WORK-THROUGH" METHOD - SEA SHED
SEA-SHED
FLOOR PAN EL S ----'-'-'-----
(OPEN)
FLOOR PANELS ----~~
(CLOSED)
SOURCE: U.S., Department of Commerce, Maritime Administratiou,
Conversion of a Non-Self-Sustaining Containership to a Ship Cargo
Off-Load System PD-261, Washin~ton, D.C.: Office of Ship Construct~on,
1981, (Figure 6)
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FLGURE 14
FLAT-RACK OPERATION - SEA SHED
TO CHANE
/
1
\
I
I·
I
i I
I
.
I
,%~:====:ij --===-~_-J i-=-===od
,·~_·..1I----~111---~-..r."
-"I
~
rSIDE CARGO~-:-- DOOR (OPEN)
- - :1ill lll i:!;1l ' ,IW .'Itl· ,
- In !il;1 r FORK LIFT
il~!I!1 W I!'ftL,
1:11: I '"", :f!/l ;~~"';',!'~'r"~ , I~ I .~! :=:~f:ii:~:;:-'~ .~I: ....~~ !r--r11 I I~il %!. ..,.J-rI I' !"d -~, r'"iL=~~~~~~~WU.L .. - ~i-- CARGO
I -:.:.:.;.;.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:::;:;:.:.:.:. ::'.:' --- "" F LA T- RAe K
II----~.I.n, [lli;n ; I l/ (SPECIAL)
,./ ...,., .7 / I---V
I '/I~k
............1--11----+-111/1i .l"
~A':~'~L _:;; :.:.:.:.;.;.:.:.:.;.:';':..; r /7/ 8 REA K 8 UL K
, :........ , / CARG
Ohl":' / 0/:t-~
, I
. 11
.\
I
.:
:1
,.
--\\
I I
" I I
I
;1 ,
FLOOR ,
(CLOSED) "-J~.I
.1
!
SEA-SHED - r-~ -= _.~
~
·WORK THROUGH-
FLOOR (OPEN)
_~J""'/~
I ~
I 11:· ..
SOURCE: U.S., Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration,
Conversion of a Non-SelF-Sustaining Containershi~ to a Ship Cargo
Off-Load System PD~]61, Washington, D.C.: Office of Ship Construction,
1981 (Figure 7)
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The advantages of the Sea-Shed and FJat Rack Systems are:
relatively low cost
ease of eonstruction and installation
easy transfer between all ships of the free world
containership fleet
commerci,al applicability for containerships in certaiA
d h . bl if 88tra es w,ere non-containerlza e cargoes are a ered.
The only significant disadvantage is that the sea-sheds
and flat racks add weight to the shtp thal: might otherwise be
llsed for cargo. Approximate weights are as follows:
Sea-Shed 30 Light Tons
Flat Rack - 7 Light Tons
Sea-Shed support stilts 14 Light Tons
Flat Rack support stilts - 2 Light Ton889
In a study utilizing a 610 ft., 872 TEU capable non-sclf-
sustaining cargo ship, C-5-S-73b lightning cJ ass, it \V'as eSl:imated
that 39 Sea-Sheds and 26 Flat Racks could be installed which, with
the associated support stilts required, would add approximately
1 550 L · h T f . h hi' 90, , 19 tons 0 - non-cargo we1g t to t e sup. The maximum
cargo weight of the sea-shed is 98.2 Light Tons, and 23 Light Tons
for the flat raek. 91 Therefore, each Sea-Shed can carry one 60-tQO
tank plus other li~hter items.
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Auxiliary Crane Ship T-ACS
Another major problem with containerships is the lack Qf
on board cranes to off load cargo. As previously mentioned,
these non-self-sustaining sh" ps may be. requh:eo to ca.ll at primitive
ports lacking the sophisticated shore crane support facilities
required to off load containerships. Newer containeFships are not
well suited for installation of cranes be.cause. of .the. lack of
sufficient deck support.
To overcome this prohlem, the Navy has developed a plan
for development of an auxiliary crane shi~ or T-ACS. The ship
type C-5-S-73b se_lected for this progt:am is the same one used as
the test bed for the Sea-Shed System. Basica y, plans cal.l Cur
two cranes to be installed on the C-5-S-73b Export Leader. These
cranes would not only provide a self-sustaining capability, but
the capability to off load other non-self-sustaining vessels as
well (see Figure 15). Since requirements for these auxiliary
crane ships exceeds the number 0 f C-5-S-73b' s available. tv.'O
ships of the President Polk eTa.ss (C-6-S-1'Oc), .!,r~si~en~ .Harrison
dM 1 b " d I 8 92am anrae, are current y elng evelnped as t1ree crane T-AC..
The cranes required will meet the following operational
characteristics:
33 static tons lift at 120 ft measured perpendicular
from outboard skin of platform
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SOURCE: Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Briefing
Visual Aid)
65 static tons lift at 75 ft
90 static tons iEt at 60 t
170/120 lifts per 20 hour day in Sea State 1
150/100 lifts per 20 hour day in Sea State 393
The cYane currently undergoing tests and evaluation is
the Bucyrus~Erie MK-IOO Marine Crane (see Figure 16), These
cranes are being installed on the Presiden~ ~ar~iso~ with a
scbeduled completion date of April, 1984. 94
There are other programs undeni7ay, such as sel f-propelled
tauseways and container off loading and discharge systems,de~;igned
to make undeveloped ports better able to handle containerized
cargo. A complete Temporary Container D'scharge Facility is also
under development with 71 mi ion dollars allocated EOT the period
]982-1988. 95
The programs to make better use of existing merchant
vessels (containerships) are an organized, realistic approach to
tbe resupply problem mentioned earlier, Once the port of debarka-
t ion h£l.s been secured by amphibious orce.s. the 'auxil iary crane
ships are in place, and the port improved as necessary, supplies
to sustain the· forces ashQre can be transported by U. S. liag or
NAT.O containersh.ips. There if>, hmvever, the same problem of bow
many containerships will actually be available and how many will
survive given the type and length of a crisis. Even with al
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available ships from the reserve and commercial' fleet n serviee,
more ships will have to be built to meet the resupply needs.
There must be a program in place to produce ships quickly and
economically to replace expected losses; a program similar to
the biberty and Victory shipbuild"ng programs of the World War
II era.
Multipurpose Mobilization Ships
In general, the lesRon learned from history is that a
mobilization type design must be extremely versatile to accomodate
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emergency needs, whi~h a~e always unpEedictable. The Mariner
design was developed prior to and constructed to assist in the
Korean War. Design chacacteristics were developed by the Maritime
Administkation and tbe U.S. Navy with national defense in mind as
well as the need for commercial competitiveness. l~til modern
unitized cargo handling techniques were implemented, the M'ar1ner
was an excellent mobilization design capable of fast multiple
1 . d' f . 97s up pro u'Ct~on or wart~me use.
A multipurpose mobilization ship of today must have many
capabilities to su-ccessfully fulfill its missIon. The design must
have. corrunercial desirahiJi ty \vhile meeting the requirements or
military transportation. In addition, the ship must be capable of
being constructed rapidly in a mobilization situation l,<,'ith limited
manu£actt~ing capacity for cricical components and large lead times. 98
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'l'he primary military considerationEor these ships is
se f-contained cargo handling capability and a redundancy in
cargo ban<.Uing. such as hold access by different ccanes or both
RO/RO and lift on/lift ofE access. 99 This will provide military
planners the versatility needed to send these ships anywhere
without having to worry about the type of port facilities available.
The commercial consideration is sjmply that the ship be
profi table in trade during peacetime. ProfitabilHy is a
combination of sufficient cargo carrying capability to reali ze
economy of scale and efficient operat.ion to minimize cost. There-
fore. the desi.gn of a mobLlization ships should lend itself to
use as is in commercial trade Qr to easy conversion to totally
unitized cargo handling and fuel efficient proPl!llsion systems
such as low speed diesels, if neces'Sary.
The type of ship designed to meet these military rerllIlre-
ments is the security class mobilization ship - C7-S-MA 13/,8
(see Figure II). It i.s a single screw ship capah~e of loading.
transporting, and discharging a mix off Roll-On/~oll-0ff.
general breakbulk, unitized. and containerized cargo. The
design features both on deck cargo handling Rear and a self-
,contained ramp for RO/RO operations. The hull design is such
that ,r-he holds can be configured for RO!RO deck space a container
storage (see Figures 18 and 19). Various alternative ship con-
figurations are also possible because of the de.sign'ed n flexihility.IOO
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FIGURE 27
SECURITY CLASS MOBILLZATIDN SHIP - C7-S-~ 1348
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INBOARD PR'OFILE
SECONJO DECK
SOURCE: George H. Levine and John F. Walter, An Update On the Contra~t Design of the
~illlti-Purpose Mobili~atiQn Ship and a Review of the-Preliminary Design PD-214, (Washington,
i[).C., U.. S. Government Printing Office, 1980) p. 18. - -~~
FIGURE 18
TYPICAL BREAKBULK AND RO/RO ARRANGEMENT
CROSS SECtION
C7-S-MA 134a
SOURCE: George H. Levine and John F. Walter, An Update
on the Contract Desi n of the MuJ.ti-Purpose Hobilization Ship
and a Review of the Preliminary Design PD-214, (WasHington, D.C.,
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980) p. 20.
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FIGURE 19
TYPICAL CONtAINER ARRANGEMENT
CROSS SECTION
C7-S-MA 134a
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SOURCE: George H. Levine and John F. Walter, An Update on
the Contract Design of the Multi-Purpose Mobilization Ship and a
Review of Preliminary Design PD~214. (l.Jashington, D.C. U. S.
Government Printing Office) 1980) p. 21.
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All configurations of the Mobilization Ship can be
engthened. The jumbo version of the lultipurpose Hobilization
Ship adds one complete hold of 110 ft. length wi.th associated
cargo handling gear to the base ~hip (see Figure 20). The
Austere version features simpler carp,o hano1.ing gea,r and u.o
I tween deck ramps, r·esult..i.ng in longer cargo handlinp, times hut
less cost and s,ophistication and sli p,htly more usable can~o
space. There is also a Container Oriented version which features
a traveling gantry crane that wil.l clear containers stacked three
hioh on the hatch covers. 101 A comparison of the various options
is shown in Table 19. It is important to note that the Jumbo
Option can carry 1,286 TEU's and the Container Oriented option
1,228 TEU's. This fits right in to Nr. Hiltzheimer's competitive
vessel profile discussed In Chapter III.
Commercial suitability of these ships is the weakest part
of this program. Hhile the Container Oriented option can carry
the requisite aID01mt of containe.r!': to he profitable, there are
many additions, such as the cranes, which commercial operators do
not want because of the extra weight which will cause greater fllt?l
consumption. Even if the cranes are removed, there is still the
need for strengthtned decks and supports to he able to install the
crane in a mobilization situation. Commercia ship operatorR are
illl1ikcly to get a sudden attack of patriotism and p,ladly install
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FIGURE 20
LENGTHENED CLASS MOBILIZATION SHIP
C8-S-MA 134a
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SECOND IDEC,K
SOURCE: George H. Levine and John F. Wa1teb, An UR~s~on ~he Contract Design of
the Multi-Purpose Mobilization Ship and a Review of Preliminary Design PD-214,
(Washington, D.C. U,S. Government Prlnting Office, 1980) p. 19.
TABLE 19
COMPARISON OF BASE MUlTI~PURPOSE"SHIP
AND ALTERNATIVE VERSIONS
OF THE PRELUlltlAnV DESIGN
I«JlTI -PURPOSE JtJ480 AUSTERE CONTAIHER-
CHAAACTE RI sn cs IJCITS MOBilIZATION SHIP OPTIC* OPTlOlC OIU£NTED OPTJOII
length Over.l1 I FT 609 719 605 005
length 8etween Perpendlcu~ars FT 560 670 560 ~60
8nlll (Molded) FT 97 97 97 97
Depth (1101 ded) fT 61.5 61.5 61.5 61.5
Lightshlp wei~ht L.T. 12,320 14,5Z0 11 ,830 12,130
Drift {Deslgn fl 30 30 30 30
t. Displacement L.T. 28,870 37,830 28,870 28,870
~. Total Deadweight L.T. 16.550 23,310 17,040 16,740
c. Hlsc. Deadweight (F.W., Stores, etc.) L.T. 450 450 450 450
d. Fuel 011 Deadwelg/t. :,l 37.5 ft3/LT t.T. 2,350 3,000 2,520 3,270
eo Cargo Oeadwelght L.T. 13,750 19,860 14,070 13,020
f. Stowage Factor (Sale Cublc/Car.go OWl) FT3/l.T. 108 99 100 113
·~... ft (Scantling) FT 35 35 35 35
"•. Oispllce~nt L.T. 34 ,810 45,290 34,810 34 ,810
b. Tolal Deadweight L.T. 22,490 30,770 22,980 22.680
c. Hisc. Deadweight (r.w., Stores, etc.) L.r. 450 450 450 450
d. Fuel 01>1 Deadweight L.T. 2,350 3,000 2,520 3.270
e. Clrgo Deadwefght L.T. 19,690 27,320 30,010 18.,960
f. Stowa9f' Filctor (Bale Cubfc/Cargo OWl) FT~/L.T. 76 72 70 77
cap.c1 ti es- (MaxilllUlI) FT~
t. Total Volume in Holds (Molded)· rrJ 1,657,000 2,166,200 1,650,400 . 1,630 ,200
b. Bile Cubic in Holds· FT3 1,491,500 1 ,963,900 1 ,488,600 1,467,200
c. S.lt Water Ballast (Molded) FT3 129,500 176,700 129.500 129,500
d. Fuel 011 (fncl. Settlin~ Tanks)(Holded) FTJ 90,300 115,300 96.900 125,600
e. Liquid Cargo (Permanent (r~lded) FT3 19 ~100 19,100 19.100 19,100
f. liquid Cargo (Optional) (Molded) fT3 123,500 155,700 123,500 115,100
g. Feed Water fT3 6,58Q 6,580 6,580 6,580
h. Potable Water fT3 5.670 5,670 5,670 5.670
f. RO/RO Deck Area (Total)* fT2 86 ,000 113,700 . 42,100 42,100
(pe rmanent)* ~ 68,000 95,700 42.100 42,100«Portllbl e(autos»* '18-,000 18,000
j. Containers (Total)* lEU 926 1.286 1,064 1,228
On Deck (20 'I 8 x various)* TEU 32B 436 352 406
Below Deck (20 x 8 x ~)~ TEU 598 350 7lZ SZZ
Max 0 COntinuous Rated Horse power 0 f Mafn [ng1 iles
•. Steam Turbine !iHP 22,500 ZZ ,500 22,500 Z2,5oo
b.. Medium Spee-d Die~el (2 engines (l 12,187) BHP 24,374 24,374 24,374 24~374
c. Slow Speed Dfesel 8HP 23,135 23,\35 23,135 23,135
Speed It Design Draft (steam)
t. TriAl KNOTS 21.5 21.1 21.5 21.5
b. Se!"Vl ce KNOTS 20.7 20.1 . 20.7 20.7
Speed at Ballast Draft (Steam)
I . .Trhl KNOTS ~2 .5 21.8 22 .5 22.5
b. ~~r-v~ce I(NnT" '1.<' 20.4 21.1 11.Z
Fuel (un~~mptlon ~ $~a (Stea~) ~ ASS MAX SHP B8l/DAY B40 840 840 840
Fuei (un~~~~t\on in ~ort (Stea~) BBl/MY 96 9fi .. 96 96
Ran'}C ~ D.IL & Sl'rvi te Speed & 90: Fuel (SteAm) N.PU. 11,100 13.300 11.900 15.500
~ro~~ Aegistered Tonnage at Desi9n Draft 15,900 18.000 1S,000 15,000
~rt Re9istered Tonnage at Design Draft 9.500 12.500 9,500 9,500
SOURCE: George H. Levine and John F. Walter, An Update on the
Contract Design of the Multi-Purpose Mobilization Ship Clnd a Revi.ew of
the Preliminary Design PD-214, (Washington, f),C., U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1980) p. 24.
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the ,ext ra equipment at their own expense. Being 800d husinessmen,
given a free choice between building a Container Oriented Mob~Iza-
tion Ship and a ship like the President Lincoln, lr-hey wi have to
go wi.th a ship like President Lincoln specifically desIgned for
theix part...icular trade. If national defense is to he taken into
account, then the government must pick up the tab. Th's wi
come in the form of legislation, sUch as the National Defense
Features Act, which allows for payment to commercial ship operators
f'or installation of equipment such as mounts for extra radio gear
or astern refueling rigs that would enhance the deiense capabiliites
of the ship. This act has been mostly unfunded in recent years
and lacks sufficient data for careful analysis.
Other uses for mobiLization ships" such as participation
in foreign charter markets ~lich~ according to some analysis,
could be quite profitable to the industry, have been proposed in
the past but have lacked sufficient government Slpport to become
,effective. The role the Federal Governmelilt has played in
determining the fate of the U. s. flag merchant marine. 1.B an
intere!'iting and complicated study within itself. The one
tbing that can be said is that judging by the current state of
the U.S. flag merchant marine it has been anything but sllccessful.
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CHAPTER V
A COHPARISON OF HILITARY AND CONMF.RCIAL INTERESTS
If the commercial shipping industry is to meet the goals
of carrying a significant portion of our foreign trade in peace-
time and, if necessary, act as t11e fourth arm of defense in ti.me
of \".ar, the Federal Government will hRve to p] ay a si~nificant
role in defining the necessary compromises between military <inc!
commercial interests.
Military planners, such as Vice Admiral Carroll, are not
looking to the industry to build RO/RO's just because the miljtary
needs them. In a January, 1983, interview Admiral Carroll was
asked directly if shipbuilders v.e.re huilding the necessary defense
capab lities into merchant vessels. Vice Admiral Carroll's
response was as follows:
No, in fairness to the shipbuilders, they huiJ<i \Vhat
shipping companies contract for, and what the shippers canLraet
for is what will make a profit. Unfortunately, that's not
breakhulk ships anymore nr Rol.l-On/Roll-Off ships or barge
ships either, yet they are the three best types fOT deploying
unit equipment overSeas. IVhat' s good for the industry is.
unfortunately, not what's good for military deployments.
The fe\" ships now under construction are being built to
serve in a peacetime environment. He've incorporated certain
national defense features on those ships, hut that doesn't
add greatly to their militaTy usefulness. 102
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Fe also quickly added that MSC didn't
In hearings before the House _erchant ~arine and Fisherie.s,
Committee in M.:.1rch, 1982, Vice Admiral Carroll. was questioned about
the relat ionshi.p between MARAn and MSC, especia 11 y funding considera-
tions. The case at that time was Arner' can Pres' dent Lines clairlls
that: the administration could not buy back three 0- their trade-
in vessels for use i.n the ~atiQnal De.fense Reserve Fleet due to
the limitations in Construction Differential Subsidy fund. Hith
MARAD unable to provide funds Vice Admiral Carroll thought that
the Navy had tG assist in providing some funding to get these
ships in to the NDRF. 103
have the necessary funds but thought something, could be workeo
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out bet~veen MSC and MARAD. The cOJ'1mittee chair~an, ~1r. fliaggi,
then made the following observation which many in the merchant
marine industry are also very quick to make:
Counsel offers the thought, and I thought it was
humorous, and you (Vice Admiral Carroll) may find it
just as humorous ... but if the Department of Defense
feels so strongly about the need for a good merchant
marine having sealift capability, why doesn't it, the
Department of Defense, provide 60me additional fundin~?105
For irs part the Military Sealift Conunand has been
putting a significant amQunt of mOfley in.to the commercial
shipping industry ~lich is one of the few things he1pin~ to
keep it alive at all. Vice Admiral Carroll is quick to point
out that \vh11e the 600 ship Navy building pTogram \.... Ul help to
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sustain the industrial base in a few years, the Military Sealift
Enhancement programs .sre visibly underway and are having a
106positive impact on the maritime economy noW.
A review of cO\llIfiercial payments by the H:Uitary Sealift
Command in F( 82, total log some one billion dollars, s.\,lpports
Vice Admiral Carroll's statemel1ts {see Table 20). Equally
impressive is the list of contracts 8Harded for the T-5, T-AKX
and t-AKR programs discussed earlier totaling approximately
1.7 bIllion dollars (~ee Table 21).
All of the sealift programs mentioned translate into
business for the, U.. S. maritime industry which could amount to
more than 15 billion dollars for the period 1982-1986. 101
The maritime industry for its part has realized the
business generated by the military and has pledged cooperation
with the military through organizations such as the Council
of American l'''lag Ship Operators (CASO). Admiral James L.
Holloway III, president of CASO, says that economic gOClls of
the U.S. flag ll.iner industry are mutually consistent - a
modern fleet of diversified ships - <:lnd includes "military
responsivenesstf as ODe of its goals for survival of the merchant
marine.
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TABLE 20
(MILITARY SEALIFT CO~~~D)
PAYNi EI~TS . . .CO I\Ii MERCIAl - FY 82
(OCT - SEP)
PERCENT OF TOTAL
COMMERCIAL SHIPPING
SH IPPING AG REEME NTS /CONTRACTS·
SHIPPING CONTRACTS·'
BERTH HRMS
TIME & VOYAGE CHARTERS
OTHER" ••
AMOUNT
($000)
$ 462,974
2,389
79,900
540,462
2,419
MSC
EXPENSES
26
4
30
COMM'L
PAYMENTS
32
6
38
TOTAL COMMERCIAL PAYMENTS
NUCLEUS
GOV'T OWNED-CONTRACT OPERATED
BAR [BOAT CHAinE RS- CONTRACl OPE RAT ED
GOVERNMENT OPERATED
OTHER'··
TOTAL COMMERCIAL PAYMENTS
TOTAL MSC EXPENSE
1.088.144
$ 58,447
146.335
10,680
129,440
$1,433,046
$1,818,655
60'10 76%
3 4
8 10
1 I
7 9
19% 100%
100%
• Rep'esents Ca,go Payments
,. Repr esenls Pell ole urn Payments
••• lnclud es for M.inle nanCe & Re pair. Acc;d ""l & Oamage. Claims,
hIla O,dina,y Repairs, Alterations. ACli.uion & Inaclivalion
tor MSC Ope' .Ied Nucleus Ships.
'----------_.-
OOOt)6091 1 !. 12 112
SOURCE: ";-111 itary Seal if t Command," De fense Transport at ion Joumal
(Annual Report), (February 1983), p. 29.
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TABLE 21
CURRENT MILITARY SEALIFT CONTRACTS
SHIPBUILDING
Ship Approx. I Del.Sld.pyard Type &No. Contract Price ($) Date (est) .
I
"I.;; (85American Shipbuild in g T-5 (unnamed) (2) 104,126,845 184,
'Ii:
General Dynamics, T-AKX (unnamed) (5) 621,500,000 /85, /?'6
Quincy I
REPAIR AND OVERHAUL
TOTAL 725,626,845
Builder Owner 'rype of Construction Value ($)
.
Avondale USN Convert SL-7 to T-AKR 48,300,O(}{)
iBethlehem. Sparrows Pt. USN Convert three ships to T-AKX 375,000,000
BethJ'ehem, Beaumont USN Conver!: two ships to T~AKX 250,000,000
NASSCO I usrx I Convert $L-7's ALr,OI. and 86,000,000
BELLATRIX to T-AKR's
NASSCO MSC Convert JOliN B. Y7ATERMAN 261,000,000
THOMAS HEYl.JARD, CHARLES
CARROLL to T-AKX Rhips
PENNSHIP USN Convert 5L-7 Cappella to 50,300,000
T-AKR
* Build and charter
TOTAL 1,070,600,000
SOURCE: "V. S. Sbipb'ui1d ing Repot't," Marine Engineering Log, Apri]
1983, pr. 135-138
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Military responsiveness is defined by CASO as follows:
The design and equipment of new ship acquisition should
inco~porate national defense features which will realistically
enhance the military sealift capabilities of individual ships,
with appropriate compensation when acquisition costs or
compe~itive commercial performance are affected,lOR
Appr,opriate compensaeion is the key to this statement.
In other words, American ships can be modified to meet national
defense capabilities as long as the government 'Pays the extra
costs involved. ~he cost of actually installing the extTR hard-
ware seems simple enough. The owners buy and install the equipm ot
under the National Defense Features Act aod give the bill to the
government. The part that's not S0 easy is the compensation
\vhen compe tit i ve performance is a f f ec ted, Th is sounds I ike ano t her
Operational Differential Subsidy which most U.S. flag vessels
al ready get for higher opera t iug cos t s due to U. S. c re\v wages,
etc. Therefore, almost in spite of what the government does to
promote a strong merchant marine, the question still comes down
to money. As long as th~ U.S. mercbant marine is a private
industry, revenue and profits will remain the standard by which
ships are built.
}fuether the money comes from MSC OT MARAD is almDst
unimportant, although both will claim ins\JIff.ilcient funds "Ioi'henever
the subjecot is debated. The impoTtant act is that the !!lOney to
make merchant slfips potential military vessels will have to come
89
from the AdminiRtration. Since funding is always limited, the most
efficient use of these funds will determine the fllture success
or failure of the merchant marine to aid the military in time
of war.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATLONS
Today's technologies have led to larger, automated port
dependent, unitized cargo vessels which lack the self-sustainab"lity
so cnrtial to military cont'ingencies. Hhile industry spokesmen
such as Cbarles I. Hiltzheimer plan for fleets. of slow speed
diesel containerships with cargo packed in eveTy available space
and no cargo handling equipment, military planners continue to
look towards RO/RO's and breakbulk vessels to meet miljtary
requirements. lJnderlying this incompatibility is the basic
conflict between the goals of carrying a significant portion of
U.S. foreign trade and national defense. As it stands now, there
is not one ship design tod,ay that can achieve both ~oals the way
breakbulk vessels did in the World War II era. In order to fully
achieve one of these goals, something will be taken away from the
other. The Soviet Union' 'S RO/RO fJ.eet is a pe-rfect example of
how profitahility is being sacrificed for national defense. Tho
United States' free market, private enterprise econoJJlY cannot do
the same.
The United States can, however, through some compromise,
mateh its goals if the government can provide clear common
objectives and mediation ~hen nccessory.
First and foremost, the U.S. flag merchant marine must be
treated as a private, profit making industry and g~ven every
reasonable legislative assistance possible to make it truly
compet-itive with forei.gn fleets who receive an equal or greater
arnount of their government's support.
The governmental assistance can come in several forms and
must cover the following major areas:
(1) Cargo - The United States must, through bilateral
agreements, guarantee a fair share of U.S. trade t'D the
U.S. flag merchant marine. Investment will increase if
there is some guarantee of future business.
(2) Shipbuilding - The industry must be free to build
the most economical, efficient ships possible even if it
means at foreign shipyards. \~lile this may weaken the
defense industrial base somewhat, there should stil~ be
enough shipbuilding busineRs from the military to rna'ntain
a minimum sumdard. If full mobilization shipbuilding
becomes necessary, designs will be such that can make use
Df many prefab~icating facilities and unskilled workers.
(3) Direct Financial Assistance - Subsidies have prov~n
to be largely ineffective. The argument has been made tbat
they are necessary because of the hiRher stand3~d of living
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in the United States and, since the merchant marine will be
needed in time of war, worth payin~. The same can be said
fa r a the rindus t rl.es, such as s teelmaking. The u. S, wi 11
also need steel in wartime but does not feel the need to
subsidize it to compete with fore.ign countries. Therefore,
indirect IIlethods. Stlch as a more liberal rate-setting policy
(antitrust) and more liberal tax policies, are likely to be
more effective.
The industry has stated time and time GRain what it needs
from the government in order to once again be competitive, and
with Senate passage of the Shipping Act of 1983 (S. 47) which
wi]] exempt the shipping inclustry from U.S. antitrQst laws,
it appears the Congress is beginning to respond ..
The military must aLso recognize that the U~S. maritime
indu~try is in business to make a profit first and then maybe
consider some national defense aspects if the government is
wilJing to pay the extra bills. P~ograms, such as Build and
Charter and Convert and Charter, benefit both the military and clle
industry and should he continued. Military planners must
continue to acquire the ships necessary to carry out a "Falkland
Island" crisis and develop programs, such as Sea-Shed and T-ACS LO
make tho best possible use of the types of ships the industry
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builds. Mobilization Ships should be built in limited quantities
at government expense to replace some older reserve vessels or
to be used as Maritime Prepositioning ships. TIlis will test
the feasibility of the plans and measure accurately the industri.al
porcntial for building these ships in tintes of crisis.
In the final analysis~ wh.ile the problems of the U.S. na.g
merchant marinc are very severe, they are not impossible. Statistics
using numbers of ships show a continual decline while a careful
ana ysi~ of actual sealift capability ton for ton has remained
pretty much the same over the last few decades. The military
will always take si.tuati.ons on a worst case basis and as long as
there are clear thinkers and planners like Vice Admiral Carroll
will never take situations as just good enough when there is a
potential to gain a clear advantage.
Throughout history, military planners have relied on a
strong viable merchant marine to be thcce when ancl if it was
needed. Insuring a strong competitive merchant marine with
enough ships to carty ~O-50% of our foreign trade will also
iusure a strong national defense.
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